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CONTINUED VIOLATIONS OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW BY THE UNITED 
STATES IN APPLYING THE DEATH 
PENALTY TO MINORS AND POSSIBLE 
REPERCUSSIONS TO THE AMERICAN 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 
INTRODUCTION 
n August 28, 2002 the American judicial system took yet 
another step backwards in the eyes of the international 
community when the United States Supreme Court issued its 
opinion denying a stay of execution to Toronto M. Patterson de-
spite the dissenters’ urging that it reconsider his claim arising 
out of the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitu-
tion.1  With total disregard of international human rights stan-
dards, the Court allowed Toronto Patterson to be executed for a 
crime that he committed as a juvenile.2  The Texas Court of 
Criminal Appeals affirmed his conviction and sentence and the 
United States Supreme Court denied his petition for a writ of 
habeas corpus3 ultimately sending Toronto Patterson to his 
death.  This Comment suggests that in doing so, the Court vio-
lated international treaties, customary international law, and 
jus cogens.4   
This Comment explores the tension between the United 
States Supreme Court’s validation of the application of the 
  
 1. Patterson v. State of Texas, 536 U.S. 984 (2002).   
 2. Id.  For the purposes of this Comment a juvenile is any child under the 
age of eighteen years.   
 3. Id.   
 4. See Convention on the Rights of the Child, Dec. 16, 1996, G.A. Res. 
44/25, U.N. GAOR, 44th Sess., Supp. No. 49, art. 37, U.N. Doc. A/44/49 (1989) 
(entered into force Nov. 10. 1989; not in force for the United States), 28 I.L.M. 
1448, 1456–76 (1989) [hereinafter CRC]; American Convention on Human 
Rights, open for signature Nov. 22, 1969, art. 4, para. 5, 1144 U.N.T.S. 143, 
146 [hereinafter American Convention]; International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights, Dec. 19. 1966, art. 6, para. 5, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 174–75 [here-
inafter ICCPR]; Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Per-
sons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949 art. 68, 75 U.N.T.S. 287, 330 [hereinafter 
Fourth Geneva Convention]. 
O 
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death penalty to children who were convicted of offenses they 
committed at the ages of sixteen and seventeen and the current 
treaty obligations of the United States concerning the execution 
of minors.5  Part I examines prior case history involving the 
death penalty as it relates to minors.  Part II provides an in-
depth explanation of the effect of reservations and the self-
executing treaty doctrine on the Unites States’ ratification and 
signatory status of several international treaties governing the 
juvenile death penalty.  Subsequent analysis focuses on the in-
ternational consensus banning the execution of juvenile crimi-
nal offenders through customary international law and jus co-
gens in Part III.  Thereafter, Part IV turns to an alternative 
argument focusing on the internal corruption of the American 
judicial system if it continues to practice juvenile execution.  
This section will analyze the concept of procedural  due process 
and its application in cases like those of Zacarias Moussaui and 
Lee Boyd Malvo, where our execution practices may be the rea-
son that other countries do not provide the evidence or wit-
nesses necessary for a full and fair trial of these, and other, in-
dividuals in the United States.  This would cause irreparable 
harm to the American judicial system. 
I. PRIOR SUPREME COURT CASE LAW ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, 
JUVENILES, AND INTERNATIONAL PRACTICES 
In 1972, in Furman v. Georgia,6 for the first time in history 
the United States Supreme Court declared the death penalty, 
as then applied, to be cruel and unusual punishment under the 
Eighth Amendment.7  However, the opinion was per curiam 
  
 5. In discussing the execution of minors the author is referring to the 
juvenile death penalty or the execution of individuals who committed the 
crimes for which they are sentenced to death as children ages 16 and 17.  The 
term “juvenile death penalty” was taken from a case comment authored by 
Elizabeth A. Reimels.  See Elizabeth A. Reimels, Comment, Playing For 
Keeps: The United States Interpretation of International Prohibitions Against 
the Juvenile Death Penalty—The U.S. Wants to Play the International Human 
Rights Game, But Only if It Makes the Rules, 15 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 303, 306 
(2001). 
 6. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1992) (holding that the arbitrary 
imposition of the death penalty on felons convicted of rape or murder was 
cruel and unusual).   
 7. “Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor 
cruel and unusual punishment inflicted.”  U.S. CONST. amend. VII.  See also 
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with each of the five Justices in the majority writing his own 
concurring opinion exemplifying vastly different reasoning, 
ranging from categorical opposition to the death penalty to con-
cern over the arbitrary nature of death sentences at the time.8  
As a result, thirty–five states revised their Death Penalty stat-
utes in an effort to conform to Supreme Court guidelines9 and 
four years later the Court rejected the view that the death pen-
alty is per se cruel and unusual punishment.10  In Gregg v. 
Georgia, the Court upheld a Georgia capital punishment law 
that utilized certain trial procedures and appeals designed to 
prevent the penalty from being imposed arbitrarily.11  The Court 
noted that based on the legislative response following Furman, 
indicating society’s endorsement of the death penalty, the evolv-
ing standard of decency argument, which had prevailed in 
Furman, could not be used to strike down capital punishment;12 
therefore the death penalty should be reinstated.   
  
BARRY LATZER, DEATH PENALTY CASES – LEADING U.S. SUPREME COURT CASES 
ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 19–44 (Butterworth-Heinenmann 1998). 
 8. Latzer, supra note 7, at 4.  In the concurring opinions of Justice Bren-
nan and Justice Marshall both Justices expressly contended that the death 
penalty was per se unconstitutional.  Justice Brennan focused on the unusual 
severity of the punishment of death because of its “finality and enormity;” 
Furman, 408 U.S. at 289 (Brennan, J., concurring); while Justice Marshall 
mainly discussed the lack of any legitimate legislative purpose; id. at 359 
(Marshall, J., concurring).  Whereas Justices Stewart and White do not be-
lieve that the death penalty is constitutionally impermissible under all cir-
cumstances; they instead indicated that given reforms to the statutes, more 
clearly defining the categories of crimes that require imposition of the death 
penalty, their votes might be swayed to form a new majority in favor of the 
death penalty.  Id. at 306–14  (Stewart, J., concurring).   
 9. Id. at 245. 
 10. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976).  See also Latzer, supra note 7, at 
4. 
 11. Id.   
 12. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 155.  After the decision in Furman, 35 states re-
wrote their death penalty statutes in an effort to conform to the guidelines 
that were set forth.  Here the Georgia statute was amended to rectify the 
problem of arbitrariness that plagued Justice Stewart and Justice White in 
Furman by stating that the imposition of the death penalty was only permit-
ted when trial judges and juries were sentencing defendants for homicides 
having certain characteristics, called aggravating factors, and only where 
there were insufficient mitigating factors (factors that make the offense less 
reprehensible).  Id. at 163.  See also Latzer, supra note 7, at 45.  Moreover the 
Georgia statute provided for bifurcated trials, which consists of a trial and 
then a separate sentencing proceeding after the defendant was found guilty, 
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Thirteen years later, Americans saw the policy of capital pun-
ishment further broadened when the Supreme Court upheld the 
legality of the use of the death penalty for sixteen and seven-
teen year old offenders in Stanford v. Kentucky.13  There, the 
Court looked at two consolidated cases where the defendants 
were convicted and sentenced to death.  In one case, a Kentucky 
minor was seventeen years and four months old when he and 
his accomplice raped, sodomized, and eventually killed their 
victim.14  The other case involved a Missouri minor who was six-
teen and a half years old when, during the commission of a rob-
bery of a convenience store, he killed the sales clerk.15  Both de-
fendants argued that the application of the death penalty in 
their respective cases violated the Eighth Amendment’s prohi-
bition against cruel and unusual punishment.16  The Court con-
sidered state and federal statutes as well as the behavior of 
prosecutors and juries as “objective indicia that reflect the pub-
lic attitude toward a given sanction”17 to determine if a “societal 
consensus” against the juvenile death penalty existed.  The 
Court concluded that according to the “evolving standards of 
decency” the punishment was not cruel and unusual and in-
stead fell within the “demonstrable current standards of our 
citizens.”18   
Of great significance was the fact that the majority’s opinion 
in Stanford was devoid of any discussion or analysis of interna-
tional views and norms, concerning the execution of convicts 
who committed the punishable offense while they were minors, 
save for a footnote stating that this type of analysis would not 
be done.19  Conversely, only one year prior to the decision in 
Stanford, the Court focused on international law standards 
  
as well as direct appeals of capital convictions to the state’s highest court.  Id.  
These procedures allayed the Justices’ fears and caused Justice Stewart and 
Justice White to change their anti-death penalty opinions, illustrated in 
Furman, to a pro-death penalty stance here.  This resulted in a new majority 
that upheld Georgia’s death penalty statute.  Gregg, 428 U.S. 153.   
 13. Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989). 
 14. Id. at 368. 
 15. Id.  
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. at 370. 
 18. Id. at 378. 
 19. Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 369 (1989).  See also Reimels, su-
pra note 5, at 306. 
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when it addressed the similar question of whether or not the 
execution of children younger than sixteen years of age was 
constitutional in Thompson v. Oklahoma.20  There, the Court 
concluded in a plurality opinion that imposing the death pen-
alty on a fifteen year old offender would “offend civilized stan-
dards of decency” in violation of the cruel and unusual punish-
ment clause of the Eighth Amendment.21  The plurality decision 
relied upon the views of the international community regarding 
the juvenile death penalty.22  The Court looked to several na-
tions’ attitudes against the juvenile death penalty in reaching 
its conclusion that a consensus existed among the international 
community opposing the execution of children.23  In addition, 
Justice Stevens noted three current international treaties 
which prohibit the use of the death penalty on juvenile offend-
ers.24  These treaties included: Article 6 Paragraph 5 of the In-
ternational Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) — a 
global civil rights treaty prohibiting the execution of minors 
  
 20. Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988) (Stevens, J., plurality 
opinion).  Thompson stands for the proposition that the imposition of the 
death penalty on juveniles is too extreme a punishment due to the fact that 
fifteen year olds do not possess the requisite culpability to be death penalty 
eligible because “during the formative years of childhood and adolescence, 
minors often lack the experience, perspective, and judgment expected of 
adults.” Id. at 834 (quoting Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 86, 104, 115–16, 
n.11 (1958)).   
 21. Id. at 821.  See also Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (Warren, 
C.J. plurality opinion) (holding that “[t]he basic concept underlying the Eighth 
Amendment is nothing less than the dignity of man ….  The amendment must 
draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the pro-
gress of a maturing society.”)  Id. at 100–01. 
 22. Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 830 (1988) (Stevens, J., plurality 
opinion). 
 23. The Court stated that “[t]he conclusion that it would offend civilized 
standards of decency to execute a person who was less than 16 years old at the 
time of his or her offense is consistent with the views that have been ex-
pressed … by other nations that share our Anglo-American heritage, and by 
the leading members of the Western European community.”  Id. at 830.  Sub-
sequently the Court mentioned the fact that several nations had either abol-
ished the death penalty or restricted its use by excluding juveniles, id. at 830–
31, specifically noting that the United Kingdom, New Zealand, and the Soviet 
Union prohibit the execution of juveniles; that Canada, Italy, Spain, and 
Switzerland allow capital punishment only for “exceptional crimes such as 
treason[;]” and that West Germany, France, Portugal, The Netherlands, and 
all of the Scandinavian countries forbid capital punishment.  Id. 
 24. Id. at 831 n.34.   
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under eighteen years of age,25 Article 4 Paragraph 5 of the 
American Convention on Human Rights — a regional human 
rights treaty prohibiting the execution of minors under eighteen 
years of age,26 and Article 68 of the Fourth Geneva Convention 
Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War 
(Fourth Geneva Convention) — which prohibits executing mi-
nors during wartimes who are under eighteen at the time of 
their offense.27  Justice O’Connor, in a concurring opinion, also 
relied on international sources and authority, pointing to the 
Senate’s ratification of the Fourth Geneva Convention to de-
termine that there could be no inference of a senatorial sanction 
of the juvenile death penalty through past legislation.28 
Admittedly, the United States Supreme Court abandoned its 
reliance on the use of international standards and treaty obliga-
tions to determine what “evolving standards of decency” are 
within the confines of the United States in deciding whether the 
imposition of the death penalty on juveniles constitutes cruel 
and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amend-
ment.  However, it is significant to note that the Court did in 
fact use this type of analysis.  By mentioning international 
standards, the Court seems to be indicating that the norms of 
the global community are important to its determination of a 
consensus regarding the juvenile death penalty.29  Furthermore, 
the United States has ratified the ICCPR30 and signed the 
United Nation’s Convention on the Rights of the Child31 since 
the Court last heard a case involving the execution of a juvenile 
  
 25. ICCPR, supra note 4, at art. 6, para. 5. 
 26. American Convention, supra note 4, at art. 4, para. 5. 
 27. Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 4, at art. 68.  See also Reimels, 
supra note 5, at 307.   
 28. Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 821–23 (1988) (O’Connor, J. 
concurring).  In referencing the obligations that the United States had under-
taken by ratifying the Geneva Convention, which prohibited the wartime exe-
cution of children under the age of eighteen at the time of their offense, Jus-
tice O’Connor undermined the dissent’s assertion that the Senate had, 
through other legislation, authorized and approved the death penalty for mi-
nors as young as fifteen.  See Reimels, supra note 5, at 308. 
 29. Reimels, supra note 5, at 309. 
 30. ICCPR, supra note 4, at art. 6, para. 5.  See also Senate Comm. on For-
eign Relations, Report on the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights, S. Exec. Rep. No. 102-23, 31 I.L.M. 645 (1992) [hereinafter Senate 
Report]. 
 31. CRC, supra note 4, at art. 6, art. 37. 
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offender, so it is possible that the next juvenile death penalty 
case it decides will come out differently.32  Thus, this Comment 
will now turn to an examination of the laws governing treaties 
in the United States with a focus on treaties concerning the Ju-
venile Death Penalty.  
  
 32. Moreover, in June of 2002, the Unites States Supreme Court ruled that 
subjecting the mentally retarded to the death penalty violated the Eighth 
Amendment’s ban on cruel and unusual punishment.  Atkins v. Virginia, 536 
U.S. 304 (2002).  That same year, in In re Stanford, the Court denied certiori 
to Kevin Stanford - another individual sentenced to death for a crime he com-
mitted as minor - over a strong dissent authored by Justice Stevens and joined 
by Justices Breyer, Ginsberg, and Souter.  These four Justices wanted not 
only to revisit the issue of the juvenile death penalty, but they were ready to 
declare it unconstitutional.  In re Stanford, 537 U.S. 968 (2002) (Stevens J., 
dissenting).  Justice Stevens went so far as to state that the Court should 
follow the majority’s analysis in Atkins and find that executing juvenile de-
fendants offends evolving standards of decency under the Eighth Amendment.  
Id.  Justice Stevens opined that most of the reasons supporting the prohibition 
of executing the mentally retarded in Atkins were present regarding the juve-
nile death penalty and thus, the Court should grant Stanford’s habeas corpus 
petition.  Id.  Interestingly, the only factor present in Atkins but absent in 
Stanford was the number of States expressly forbidding the juvenile death 
penalty; twenty-eight states ban the execution of juvenile offenders whereas 
thirty states banned the execution of the mentally retarded.  Id.  Regardless, 
unlike Toronto Patterson, Kevin Stanford’s life was spared when the Governor 
of Kentucky granted him clemency on December 8, 2003 and commuted his 
death sentence to life imprisonment evincing further evidence of anti-juvenile 
death penalty sentiments.  Thus, not only has the international consensus 
been solidified against the juvenile death penalty but there also appears to be 
a concomitant national consensus forming on the subject as well.  See also 
Jeffrey M. Banks, In Re Stanford: Do Evolving Standards of Decency Under 
Eighth Amendment Jurisprudence Render Capital Punishment Inapposite for 
Juvenile Offenders?, 48. S.D. L. REV. 327, 353 (2003).   
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II. INTERNATIONAL TREATIES AND THEIR APPLICATION IN THE 
UNITED STATES COURT SYSTEM 
A. Treaties in General and the Impact of Senate Reservations 
and the Self-Executing Doctrine on Their Implementation 
1. Overview of the Laws Governing Treaties in the United 
States and Abroad 
A treaty is “an international agreement concluded between 
States in written form and governed by international law.”33  
Since treaties are the principal source of international law,34 it 
was important to codify that law through the Vienna Conven-
tion on the Law of Treaties (Vienna Convention).35  Although 
the United States is not a party to the Vienna Convention, its 
Department of State as well as its courts have indicated that 
they consider the Vienna Convention an accurate restatement 
of the customary international law of treaties; thus the Re-
statement (Third) of The Foreign Relations Law of the United 
States (Restatement) adopted most of its text from that treaty.36  
However, supplementing governance by the Vienna Convention, 
treaties are also subject to the constraints of the United States 
Constitution, customary international law, and domestic and 
international judicial decisions in addition to the influence of 
the academic writings of legal scholars.37 
According to the Constitution, treaties are the “supreme Law 
of the Land.”38  While early in our nation’s history treaties were 
  
 33. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 2(1)(a), 
1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 333 (entered into force Jan. 27, 1980; not in force for the 
United States) [hereinafter Vienna Convention].   
 34. Id. at 332. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Stefan A. Riesenfeld & Fredrick M. Abbott, The Scope of U.S. Senate 
Control Over the Conclusions and Operation of Treaties, 67 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 
571, 574 (1991).  See also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW OF FOREIGN 
RELATIONS: PART III INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS, Introductory Note (1987) 
(referring to the State Department’s statements that “although not yet in 
force, the Convention is already generally recognized as the authoritative 
guide to current treaty law and practice.”) (quoting S. Exec. Doc. L., 92nd 
Cong., 1st sess. (1971) p.1.) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT]. 
 37. Id.  See also Reimels, supra note 5, at 311.   
 38. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 providing that: “This Constitution, and the 
Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all 
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believed to be extra-constitutional, it is now widely accepted 
that agreements with foreign nations can only grant power to a 
branch of our government subject to Constitutional restraints.39  
Furthermore, whereas the Constitution takes precedence over a 
treaty, a treaty is understood to be the equivalent of a federal 
statute.40  Nevertheless, where a treaty and a federal statute are 
found to be conflicting, the most recently enacted instrument 
supercedes the other; this gives rise to the “last in time doc-
trine.”41  However, the last in time rule only applies to interac-
tions between treaties and federal law; thus a treaty is superior 
to state law as well as any state constitution.42   
Article II Section 2 of the United States Constitution confers 
on the President the power to enter the United States into trea-
ties with the advice and consent of two thirds of the Senate.43  
After a treaty has been negotiated by the Executive branch, it is 
sent to the Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate, which 
prepares a report and recommends to the full Senate whether 
or not to ratify the treaty.44  This recommendation can include 
proposed amendments to the treaty such as reservations, un-
derstandings, declarations or provisos.45  After assent of the 
  
Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United 
States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every state 
shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution of Laws of any State to 
the Contrary notwithstanding.” See also Riesenfeld & Abbott, supra note 36, 
at 576.   
 39. See Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 16–17 (1957) (holding that a treaty can-
not be used to deprive a citizen of a constitutional right).  See also Reimels, 
supra note 5, at 310.   
 40. Id. at 18.  See also RESTATEMENT, supra note 36, § 115. 
 41. See Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. 581 (1889); Whitney v. Robert-
son, 124 U.S. 190 (1888); Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580 (1884); Cherokee 
Tobacco Case, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 616 (1870).  These cases all illustrate the 
concepts that treaties cannot exceed the boundaries of rights and duties cre-
ated by the United States Constitution, that a treaty supersedes a prior in-
consistent federal statute, and that a subsequent inconsistent federal statute 
supersedes a treaty; creating the “last in time doctrine.”  See also Riesenfeld & 
Abbott, supra note 36, at 577; Reimels, supra note 5, at 310.   
 42. Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920). 
 43. “He shall have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Sen-
ate to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present concur.”  
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
 44. Riesenfeld & Abbott, supra note 36, at 580.   
 45. Id.  See also infra pp. 1256–60 on reservations. In United States prac-
tice, an “understanding” generally refers to a statement by which the govern-
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Senate is given, the President may ratify the treaty as long as 
any additional conditions attached to the resolution of ratifica-
tion are fulfilled.46  Furthermore, since the President has the 
power to execute the laws of the land and a treaty is the law of 
the land, it is the President’s role to carry out a treaty’s terms.47  
However, the Supreme Court is granted the final power to in-
terpret treaties under Article III of the United States Constitu-
tion.48 
2. Reservations to Treaties 
Part I Article 2 of the Vienna Convention defines a reserva-
tion as “a unilateral statement … made by a state when sign-
ing, ratifying, accepting, approving, or acceding to a treaty, 
whereby it purports to exclude or to modify the legal effect of 
certain provisions of the treaty in their application to that 
  
ment expresses its interpretation, clarification, or elaboration of a particular 
treaty provision and a “declaration” generally refers to a statement by which 
the government states its position with respect to the applicability or non-
applicability of the rules of a separate treaty or international law to the treaty 
in question.  See Riesenfeld & Abbott, supra note 36, at 602.  The third type of 
Senate condition or understanding is a proviso which “includes those [condi-
tions] which are not intended to be included in the formal instruments of rati-
fication because they do not involve the other parties to the treaty but instead 
relate to issues of U.S. law or procedure.”  Id. at 619 (quoting Congressional 
Research Service, Treaties and Other International Agreements: The Role of 
The United States Senate,  A Study Prepared for the Committee on Foreign 
Relations by the Congressional Research Service, S. Rpt. No. 98-205, 110, 
98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984)).   
 46. Id.  “The Senate does not itself ratify a treaty, but rather passes a reso-
lution of ratification authorizing the President to ratify.  Reservations, under-
standings and declarations are included in the [S]enate’s resolution of ratifica-
tion and transmitted to the President for inclusion in the instrument of ratifi-
cation ….”  Id. at n.59. 
 47. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, providing that: “The executive Power shall be 
vested in a President of the United States of America.”  See also 
RESTATEMENT, supra note 36, § 1 reporter’s note 2 & § 326 cmt. a.   
 48. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1, providing that: “The judicial Power of the 
United States, shall be vested in one supreme court, and in such inferior 
Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish.”  More-
over, U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 provides that: “The judicial Power shall extend 
to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of 
the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their 
Authority ….” 
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State.”49  Part II Section 2 Articles 19 through 23 of the Vienna 
Convention govern reservations.  Generally, a reservation made 
by a party to a treaty is valid and effective if it does not defeat 
the object and purpose of the treaty and it is not prohibited by 
the terms of the treaty.50  Another party to the treaty can object 
to the reservation but that objection does not necessarily make 
the treaty, as a whole, per se invalid between the reserving and 
objecting parties.51  Instead the objection excludes the provision 
in the treaty to which the reservation and objection apply as 
between those two parties.52  Only if the objecting party ex-
pressly articulates that it does not intend to be bound by the 
treaty as a whole will the objection preclude the entry into force 
of the treaty as between the reserving and objecting parties.53  
Moreover, if a party to a treaty does not object to the reserva-
tion in a timely manner, then that party is presumed to have 
accepted the reservation and to be willing to be bound with the 
reserving party.54  Therefore, reservations and objections only 
apply to the parties to whom they have been addressed and 
have no effect on the treaty obligations of other parties in a 
multilateral treaty.55 
The Senate routinely attaches reservations to treaties which 
it receives for advice and consent.56  Recently, the Senate has 
attempted to expressly reserve the supremacy of the internal 
law of the United States57 by making reservations which modify 
the results of treaty obligations domestically from the original 
intent of the treaty negotiators.58  As one scholar notes, “[b]y its 
  
 49. Vienna Convention, supra note 33, at art. 2(1)(d).   
 50. Id. at art. 19.  See also RESTATEMENT, supra note 36, § 313.  Further-
more, according to general international law a reservation is also invalid if it 
violates customary international law or if it conflicts with a newly emergent 
peremptory norm of international law (jus cogens).  Connie de la Vega & Jen-
nifer Brown, Can a United States Treaty Reservation Provide a Sanctuary for 
the Juvenile Death Penalty?, 32 U.S.F.L. L. Rev. 735, 754 (1998).   
 51. Id. at art. 20.   
 52. Id. at art. 21.   
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. at art. 20.   
 55. Id. at art. 21.  See also Riesenfeld & Abbott, supra note 36, at 586. 
 56. Riesenfeld & Abbott, supra note 36, at 586.   
 57. Id. at 573. 
 58. Reimels, supra note 5, at 311.  See also infra pp. 1271–75 discussing 
the United States reservations to the ICCPR.   
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reservations, the United States apparently seeks to assure that 
its adherence to a convention will not change, or require 
change, in U.S. laws, policies or practices, even where they fall 
below International standards.”59  While it is true that some 
reservations facilitate the ratification of treaties,60 as well as 
help bring them into compliance with the United States Consti-
tution, many reservations recently issued have been much 
broader than necessary.61  As reservations have historically 
identified specific domestic legislation with which the treaty 
may be incompatible, leading scholars believe that broad reser-
vations might prove impermissible.62   
Moreover, if a reservation is deemed invalid,63 it can either be 
severed from the party’s accession to the treaty, in which case 
the party is still bound by the original treaty provisions, or if 
the invalid reservation cannot be separated, then the State 
would no longer be a party to the instrument.64  A growing in-
ternational consensus has concluded that an invalid reservation 
  
 59. Louis Henkin, U.S. Ratification of Human Rights Conventions: The 
Ghost of Senator Bricker, 89 AM. J. INT’L L. 341, 342 (1995).  However, Profes-
sor William A. Schabas makes a valid point that article 27 of the Vienna Con-
vention does not allow a party to a treaty to invoke the provisions of its inter-
nal law as a justification for its failure to perform a treaty.  William A. Scha-
bas, Invalid Reservations to the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights: Is the United States Still a Party?, 21 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 277, 284 
(1995).  Even though the United States is not a party to that treaty it does use 
the treaty as a guide for foreign relations law and as such should prohibit the 
use of domestic law as an excuse for violations of its treaty obligations 
through reservations.  But See RESTATEMENT, supra note 36, § 115 (stating 
that the “last in time rule” applies to conflicting treaty and federal statute 
terms but not state statute or state constitutional terms).   
 60. Schabas, supra note 59, at 287.   
 61. Reimels, supra note 5, at 311 (citing Henkin, supra note 59, at 342–44). 
It is argued that the reason for these over broad reservations is to curtail the 
effect of the treaty, to which they apply, when implementing it domestically.   
 62. Schabas, supra note 59, at 283, 291.  For example, Norway and Ireland 
both issued reservations to article 6, paragraph 5 of the ICCPR which prohib-
its the imposition of the death penalty for crimes committed when an individ-
ual is younger than eighteen years-of-age.  There, both countries identified a 
specific paragraph in article 6 with which their domestic law did not comply; 
on the other hand the United States’ reservation encompassed practically all 
of the provision.  Id. at 291.   
 63. See also supra pp. 1256–57 and n.50 for a discussion of what invali-
dates a treaty.   
 64. Schabas, supra note 59, at 278.  See also RESTATEMENT, supra note 36, 
§ 311 cmt. b & reporter’s notes 2–3.  
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should be severed from the document of instrumentation.65  A 
noteworthy illustration of this was made by the European Court 
of Human Rights in the case of Belilos v. Switzerland where, in 
conformity with the Vienna Convention, a Swiss statement to 
the Court was determined to be an invalid reservation to the 
European Convention on Human Rights due to its inconsistency 
with the express terms as well as the object and purpose of the 
treaty.66  There, the European Court of Human Rights held that 
if a non-essential (derogable) reservation is invalid, it is severed 
from the treaty and the country submitting the reservation is 
still a party to the treaty and, as such, is bound by the provision 
without the reservation.67  This marked the first decision of an 
international tribunal with respect to the international law of 
treaties and treaty reservations that nullified the reservation 
and applied the treaty in its totality to the reserving State.68   
Significantly, with respect to human rights treaties, reserva-
tions have frequently been criticized for weakening the overall 
effectiveness of the norms that they are trying to create as 
minimum standards.69  The difference between human rights 
treaties and other types of treaties is that “parties to human 
rights treaties agree to protect individuals within their jurisdic-
tions, while parties to other treaties take on obligations con-
  
 65. See Connie de la Vega, Amici Curiae Urge the U.S. Supreme Court to 
Consider International Human Rights Law in Juvenile Death Penalty Case, 42 
SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1041, 1053.  See also Henry J. Bourguignon, The Belilos 
Case: New Light on Reservations to Multilateral Treaties, 29 VA. J. INT’L L. 347 
(1989).   
 66. Belilos v. Switzerland, 132 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1988), reprinted in 10 
Eur. H.R. Rep. 466 (1988).   
 67. Id.  See de la Vega, supra note 65, at 1053.  In deciding whether the 
reservation was non-essential the Court considered whether the country’s 
overriding intention was to accept the obligations under the treaty.  Id.  See 
also Bourguignon, supra note 65, at 382.   
 68. Riesenfeld & Abbott, supra note 36, at 588–89.  Similarly, in an advi-
sory opinion issued by the Inter-American Court on Human Rights, a Guate-
malan death penalty reservation was invalidated because it sought to suspend 
a non-derogable fundamental right of the treaty and thus was incompatible 
with the object and purpose of the American Convention.  de la Vega & 
Brown, supra note 50, at 755 (quoting Edward Sherman, The U.S. Death Pen-
alty Reservation to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: 
Exposing the Limitations of the Flexible System Governing Treat Formation, 
29 TEX. INT’L L.J.69, 79 (1994)).   
 69. Schabas, supra note 59, at 287.   
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cerning their actions with respect to each other.”70  The object 
and purpose of human rights conventions are to promote re-
spect for the basic rights of individual human beings by having 
party states mutually assume legal obligations to ensure those 
recognized rights within their borders in accordance with inter-
national standards.71  Thus, reservations to human rights trea-
ties that make general allusions to domestic law are disap-
proved of and often provoke formal objections72 because in es-
sence, by adhering to human rights conventions subject to these 
reservations, the State is “pretending to assume international 
obligations but in fact … undertaking nothing.”73 
3. The Self-Executing Doctrine in the Application  
of Treaties to Domestic Law 
The self-executing doctrine, like Senate imposed reservations 
to treaties, has a significant impact on the execution and en-
forcement of treaties.  The Supremacy Clause of the United 
States Constitution states that treaties are the supreme law of 
the land.74  This Clause effectuated “a wholesale incorporation of 
U.S. treaties into domestic law, dispensing with the need for 
retail transformation of treaties into domestic law by Con-
gress.”75  The self-executing treaty doctrine is a judicially cre-
  
 70. de la Vega & Brown, supra note 50, at 754.   
 71. Henkin, supra note 59, at 343.  See also The Effect of Reservations on 
the Entry into Force of the American Convention (Arts. 74 and 75), Advisory 
Opinion No. OC-2/82 of Sept. 24, 1982, Inter-Am. C.H.R., ser. A: Judgments 
and Opinions, No. 2, para. 29 (1982), reprinted in 22 I.L.M. 37, 47 (1983); de la 
Vega & Brown, supra note 50, at 754.   
 72. Schabas, supra note 59, at 284.  For example the U.S. reservations to 
articles 6 and 7 of the ICCPR were answered with objections from eleven 
party States.  Id. at 310.    
 73. Henkin, supra note 59, at 344.    
 74. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.   
 75. Carlos Manuel Vazquez, The Four Doctrines of Self-Executing Treaties, 
89 AM. J. INT’L L. 695, 699 (1995).  This was done in response to the rule in 
Great Britain that all treaties required, and still require, implementing legis-
lation passed by Parliament before they would be enforced by officials apply-
ing domestic law, regardless of the treaty’s terms or intents.  Id. at 698.  Dur-
ing the time of the Articles of Confederation, Great Britain repeatedly violated 
the Treaty of Peace.  Id.  Moreover, treaties concluded by the Continental 
Congress were not enforceable as law in the courts of the states if there was 
conflicting state legislation and no repealing acts of legislation were passed.  
Id.  Therefore, to combat these problems with the implementation of treaties 
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ated rule developed as a qualification to the Supremacy 
Clause.76  Generally, a self-executing treaty is one that may be 
enforced, once it is ratified, without requiring prior domestic 
legislation to take effect, whereas a non-self-executing treaty is 
one that may not be enforced in the courts without prior legisla-
tive implementation.77  Courts have applied several different 
theories in determining whether a treaty is self-executing.78  
Professor Carlos Vazquez identified four distinct doctrines of 
self-executing treaties.79  The first and most widely accepted of 
these doctrines is the intent-based doctrine80 which was intro-
duced into United States jurisprudence by the Supreme Court 
in Foster v. Neilson.81  The dispute arose over a claim to a tract 
of land in Florida on the basis of a grant from Spain.82  The 
Court ultimately held that it could not recognize the grant as 
valid under domestic law because the language of the treaty 
indicated the intention that Congress enact legislation confirm-
  
the Framers adopted the Supremacy Clause declaring treaties as the supreme 
law of the land and directing courts to give them effect without awaiting ac-
tions by the legislatures of either the states or the federal government.  Id. at 
699.   
 76. Id. at 697–98.  See generally Connie de la Vega, Civil Rights during the 
1990’s: New Treaty Law Could Help Immensely, 65 U. CIN. L. REV. 423 (1997).   
 77. Vazquez, supra note 75, at 695.   
 78. Id.  While Professor Vazquez’s determination of four distinct doctrines 
of the theory of self-executing treaties has been the most widely accepted, 
there are other legal scholars who have discovered different tests of the self-
executing nature of treaties.  For example, Professor de la Vega has distin-
guished three tests that courts in the United States have used to decide 
whether a clause of a particular treaty is self-executing.  de la Vega, supra 
note 76, at 448.  In the first test, the Court establishes whether or not the 
treaty is equivalent to a legislative act and if it is then the treaty is self-
executing.  Id.  In the second test the Court examines the responsibilities 
mandated by the treaty provision to see if they require self execution.  Id.  
Finally, the third test that Professor de la Vega describes is intent based.  Id. 
at 446–47.  Here, there has been some debate because courts have differed as 
to where they find this intent to make the treaty self-executing.  Some courts 
have looked for the “intent of the parties” as reflected in the words of the 
treaty alone whereas others have determined the intent through looking at 
the words of the treaty in addition to the circumstances surrounding its exe-
cution.  de la Vega, supra note 65, at 1041.   
 79. Id. at 696. 
 80. Id. at 699–700. 
 81. Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253 (1829).   
 82. Id. at 253.   
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ing the grant.83  However, the Court also noted that because the 
Constitution makes a treaty the law of the land it is “to be re-
garded in courts of justice as equivalent to an act of the legisla-
ture, whenever it operates of itself without the aid of any legis-
lative provision.”84  The Court narrowed the scope of non-self-
executing treaties in United States v. Percheman when, by fo-
cusing on both the Spanish and English text of the treaty, it 
held that the treaty did “operate of itself” and could be applied 
by the courts without legislative implementation.85  Thus, the 
decisions in Foster and Percheman recognized the general rule 
that treaties do not require legislative implementation in the 
United States “by their nature,” but may require legislative im-
plementation through the affirmative agreement of the parties 
clearly stating that it is the parties’ intent to alter that rule.86   
Recently, however, the courts have changed their focus when 
determining intent for self-execution doctrine purposes.  Lower 
courts have sought to discern the intent of the United States 
negotiators of the treaty, the President and the Senate, instead 
of the intent of all of the parties to the treaty and have done so 
by looking beyond the actual terms of the treaty.87  Indeed, the 
courts have begun to perceive the inquiry as a search for the 
unilateral intent of the President in ratifying the treaty or the 
Senate in giving its advice and consent.88  The Restatement 
adopts this test of determining intent by reasoning that if there 
is no language in the international agreement as to its self-
executing character and the intention of the United States is 
unclear, “account must be taken of any statement by the Presi-
dent in concluding the agreement, or in submitting it to the 
Senate for consent, or to the Congress as a whole for approval, 
and of any expression by the Senate or by Congress in dealing 
with the agreement.”89   
  
 83. Id. at 314.    
 84. Id.  See also Vazquez, supra note 75, at 700.   
 85. United States v. Percheman, 32 U.S. (2 Pet.) 51 (1833).   
 86. Vazquez, supra note 75, at 702, 704.   
 87. Id. at 705.   
 88. Id.   
 89. RESTATEMENT, supra note 36, § 111 cmt. h.  See also RESTATEMENT, 
supra note 36, § 314 cmt. h, d & § 303 cmt. d.  However, there has been much 
debate as to whether the intent of only one of the parties would determine the 
effect of a particular clause in the case of multilateral agreements. de la Vega, 
supra note 76, at 448.   
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Moreover, the courts seem to have reversed the Foster and 
Percheman principle that, absent a clear statement of intent by 
the parties to have a treaty be subject to implementing legisla-
tion, it is self-executing; courts now look for evidence of an in-
tent on the part of the United States officials to make the treaty 
self-executing and without it will presume that the treaty is 
non-self-executing and thus not enforceable in the courts with-
out legislative implementation.90  Futhermore, even the inten-
tion of the parties that the Court is trying to determine has be-
come confused.  For example, recently the intent relevant to the 
self-execution inquiry has been described as an intent to create 
“private rights,” or “judicially enforceable private rights,” or as 
“private rights of action,” or as an intent that the provision be 
judicially enforceable at the behest of individuals.91  The prob-
lems with this are that it leads to the misassumption that a 
treaty’s judicial enforceability is always a mater of intent, 
whereas that is not always the case, and it does not clarify the 
kind of intent necessary to make a treaty self-executing.92 
The second doctrine noted by Professor Vazquez is the justi-
ciability doctrine.93  Under this doctrine, the inquiry does not 
involve a “search for evidence of an intent regarding whether 
the ultimate object of the treaty was to be accomplished through 
future acts of legislation.”94  Instead courts have viewed a 
treaty’s self-executing or non-self-executing nature as “a char-
acteristic that exists independently of any intent to require leg-
islation” and have discerned this essence through any guidance 
that they find useful.95  An illustration of this approach is con-
tained in the decision in Frolova v. USSR, where the 7th Circuit 
Court of Appeals enumerated the factors that it considered 
relevant to the inquiry into whether the treaty was intended to 
  
 90. Vazquez, supra note 75, at 708.  See RESTATEMENT, supra note 36, § 
111 cmt. h. 
 91. Id. at 710.  While the concepts of the private right of action and the 
self-executing treaty doctrine are distinct, Professor Vazquez has deciphered 
at least one self-executing treaty doctrine that considers whether the treaty 
has created a private right of action for individuals in determining the self-
executing nature of that treaty.   
 92. Id.  This concept will be further discussed infra pp. 1263–69 when we 
turn to the other three self-executing treaty doctrines described by Vazquez.   
 93. Id.   
 94. Id. at 711.   
 95. Id.   
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be self-executing.96  The Court in Frolova did not search for ac-
tual intent or even an inference of intent; instead it imputed 
intent based on factors that addressed reasons, unrelated to 
intent, as to why the treaty obligation should not have been ju-
dicially enforceable.97 
Other factors that some courts have considered in determin-
ing whether particular treaties are self-executing, and therefore 
judicially enforceable without additional legislation by Con-
gress, are the precatoriness of certain provisions, the inde-
terminateness of a provision, and the case-by-case analysis of a 
treaty.98  These types of provisions are deemed judicially unen-
forceable not because of the parties’ intent but because in our 
domestic system of separated powers the object of the provision 
is considered to be a political task and not one for the courts to 
perform.99  Other provisions have been held unenforceable be-
cause they did not set forth “sufficiently determinate standards 
for evaluating the conduct of the parties and their attendant 
rights and liabilities.”100  Today, lower courts have tried to an-
swer the self-execution question by inquiring as to whether a 
  
 96. Frolova v. Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 761 F.2d 370, 370–76 (7th 
Cir. 1985).  Those factors included:  
(1) the language and purposes of the agreement as a whole; (2) the 
circumstances surrounding its execution; (3) the nature of the obliga-
tions imposed by the agreement; (4) the availability and feasibility of 
the alternative enforcement mechanisms; (5) the implications of per-
mitting a private right of action; and (4) the capability of the judiciary 
to resolve the dispute. 
 97. Vazquez, supra note 75, at 711.   
 98. Id. at 712–17.  Precatory treaty provisions do not impose obligations 
but instead set forth aspirations.  Id. at 712.   
 99. Id. at 713.  Moreover, it is interesting to note that this test for discern-
ing the self-executing nature of a treaty was not the same as that originally 
applied in Foster and Percheman.  There, the question was whether intent to 
have a self-executing or non-self-executing treaty could be inferred from the 
text of the treaty itself.  Id. at n.77.  In contrast, using the precatory nature of 
a provision as a reason to say it is non-self-executing makes the provision 
judicially unenforceable without regard to the parties’ intent concerning judi-
cial enforcement.  Id.   
 100. Vazquez, supra note 75, at 713.  This variant on the issue of self-
execution originates from dicta in the Supreme Court’s decision in the Head 
Money Cases, where the Court said that a treaty can be judicially enforced by 
private individuals when it “prescribes a rule by which the rights of the pri-
vate citizen or subject may be determined.”  Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580, 
598–99 (1884).  See also Vazquez, supra note 75, at 714. 
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treaty is “too vague for judicial enforcement,”101 or if it “provides 
specific standards,”102 or if it is “phrased in broad generalities.”103  
The Restatement has fortified this modification of the self-
executing treaty doctrine by stating that a treaty is self-
executing if it “can be readily given effect without further legis-
lation.”104  Furthermore, some lower courts have treated the self-
executing inquiry as a more “free-wheeling inquiry” into the 
treaty’s judicial enforceability, taking into account many factors 
in addition to precatoriness and indeterminateness.105  Thus this 
third and final variant of the justiciability doctrine seems to ask 
courts to engage in an “open-ended inquiry to determine on a 
case-by-case basis whether judicial enforcement of a particular 
treaty is a good idea.”106   
  
 101. People of Saipan v. United States Dep’t of Interior, 502 F.2d 90, 99 (9th 
Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 1003 (1975). 
 102. Diggs v. Richardson, 555 F.2d 848, 851 (D.C. Cir. 1976).  See also 
American Baptist Churches v. Meese, 712 F. Supp. 756, 770 (S.D. Cal. 1989).    
 103. Frolova v. Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 761 F.2d 370, 374 (7th 
Cir. 1985). 
 104. RESTATEMENT, supra note 36, § 111 reporter’s note 5.  Similar to the 
line between precatory and obligatory provisions, the line between vague and 
“judicially discoverable and manageable standards,” Golden State Transit 
Corp. v. Los Angles, 493 U.S. 103, 106 (1989), is a domestic constitutional 
divide that also serves to allocate powers between the courts and the legisla-
ture.  Vazquez, supra note 75, at 714–15.  For example, in People of Saipan 
the Court listed the following factors as relevant to determining whether a 
treaty “establishes affirmative and judicially enforceable obligations without 
implementing legislation: … the purposes of the treaty and the objectives of 
its creators, the existence of domestic procedures and institutions appropriate 
for direct implementation, the availability and feasibility of alternative 
enforcement methods, and the immediate and long-range social consequences 
of self or non-self-execution.”  People of Saipan, 502 F.2d at 97.   
 105. Vazquez, supra note 75, at 715.   
 106. Id.  Moreover, it is important to note the differences between the “in-
tent-based” branch of self-execution and the “justiciability-based” branch.  The 
justiciability-based branch calls for a constitutional separation-of-powers de-
termination analogous to a political question decision.  Id. at 717.  This kind 
of determination affects not only the particular treaty or treaty provision in 
question but also all provisions like it that may come before the court.  Id. at 
n.102.  In contrast, with regard to the intent-based branch, the parties to the 
treaty may make a treaty judicially unenforceable for any rational reason and 
their decision does not have any necessary implications regarding the judicial 
enforceability of other similar treaties.  Id.    
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The third self-executing treaty doctrine identified by Profes-
sor Vasquez is the constitutionality doctrine.107  According to the 
Restatement “[a]n international agreement cannot take effect 
as domestic law without implementation by Congress if the 
agreement would achieve what lies within the exclusive law-
making power of Congress under the Constitution.”108  Although 
there is no definitive judicial authority endorsing this variant of 
the self-executing treaty doctrine,109 Professor Vazquez finds 
support for it in the Supremacy Clause.110  The test here is 
whether the treaty - makers possess the power to accomplish 
what they have set out to do in the treaty; if so the treaty is 
self-executing and if not, because the power lies with Congress, 
the treaty is non-self-executing.111  However, due to the dearth of 
case law dealing with the constitutionality version of the self-
executing doctrine, this category appears to have limited practi-
cal significance.112   
The fourth and final category of the self-executing doctrines 
documented by Professor Vazquez is the private right of action 
doctrine.113  This variant on the doctrine asks the question of 
  
 107. Id. at 718.   
 108. RESTATEMENT, supra note 36, § 111 cmt. i.   
 109. RESTATEMENT, supra note 36, § 111 reporter’s note 6.   
 110. Vazquez, supra note 75, at 717.  By illustrating how treaties are sub-
ject to all of the provisions of the Constitution the professor concludes that 
treaties are unable to accomplish goals which would not be consistent with the 
freedoms guaranteed by it, thus making those types of treaties unenforceable.  
Id.   
 111. Id.  Significantly, this category of self-executing treaty doctrine differs 
considerably from the intent-based category in that in the latter, the treaty’s 
non-self-executing character is derived from the intent of the parties or the 
treaty makers, whereas in the former the treaty is non-self-executing because 
of the treaty makers’ constitutional disability.  Id.  “Additionally, while the 
constitutionality version of the doctrine is similar to the justiciability version 
because both require judgments about constitutional allocations of power, the 
justiciability version requires a judgment about the distribution of the power 
to enforce particular kinds of treaty provisions between the courts and the 
legislature and the constitutionality version requires a judgment about the 
distribution of the power to accomplish certain ends between the treaty mak-
ers and the lawmakers.”  Id.   
 112. Id.   
 113. Vazquez, supra note 75, at 719.  The concept that a treaty is self-
executing and thus judicially enforceable only if it creates a private right of 
action found its origin in the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals 
case Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic when Judge Bork in his concurring 
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whether the treaty at issue confers a “private right of action” 
such that private parties can maintain an action in court to en-
force the treaty.114  However, it is incorrect to assume that a 
treaty can be enforced in court by private parties only if it con-
fers a private right of action itself.115  Even if a treaty, like many 
constitutional provisions and federal statutes, imposes primary 
obligations on individuals without expressly addressing matters 
of enforcement, it may still be judicially enforceable.116  This is 
due to the fact that treaties may be supplemented by the com-
mon law117 as well as state118 and federal119 statutory law that 
confer “rights of action.”120   Given that the purpose of the do-
mestic courts in our governmental system, since Marbury v. 
Madison,121 has been to provide a remedy for the infringement of 
individual rights, “by implication the Supremacy Clause, as it 
concerns treaties, was intended to confer rights upon individu-
als.”122  Significantly, even without a private right of action pri-
vate individuals may “enforce such treaties defensively if they 
  
opinion considered “whether a right of action could be found in the treaties 
invoked by the plaintiffs [to determine the self-executing nature of the 
treaty].”  Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774 (D.C. Cir. 1984).   
 114. Id.  However, according to the Restatement, “[w]hether a treaty is self-
executing is a question distinct from whether the treaty creates private rights 
or remedies.” RESTATEMENT, supra note 36, § 111 cmt. h.  Professor Vazquez 
rebuts this by noting that while a treaty that does not itself confer a private 
right of action can correctly be described as non-self-executing, if the Re-
statement is read as discussing the distinction introduced in Foster regarding 
self-executing treaties, then the private right of action self-executing treaty 
doctrine is not in conflict with the Restatement.  Vazquez, supra note 75, at 
719, n.134.   
 115. Id. 
 116. Id.   
 117. Actions of debt and ejectment are two examples of instances where 
treaties have been enforced in court through common law forms of action.  
See, e.g., Florida v. Furman, 180 U.S. 402, 428 (1901) (action to remove cloud 
on legal title); Botiller v. Dominquez, 130 U.S. 238, 243 (1889) (action in the 
nature of ejectment).   
 118. See, e.g., Jordan v. Tashiro, 278 U.S. 123, 125 (1928) (state mandamus 
action). 
 119. See, e.g., Baldwin v. Franks, 120 U.S. 678 (1887) (civil rights legisla-
tion).   
 120. Vazquez, supra note 75, at 720.   
 121. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 170 (1803).   
 122. Reimels, supra note 5, at 315.  See also Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 
(1957); Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920). 
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are being sued or prosecuted under statutes that are inconsis-
tent with [the] treaty provisions.”123  This defensive use of a 
treaty is a judicially accepted means for litigants to successfully 
enforce treaty provisions without asking courts to determine 
whether the provisions are self-executing.124  Therefore, while a 
court ruling or Senate proclamation that a treaty is non-self-
executing may prevent bringing a direct cause of action under 
the treaty, the treaty can still be relied upon as a defense to a 
criminal charge125 or the imposition of a sentence such as the 
death penalty.   
Professor Vazquez’s four variants on the self-executing treaty 
doctrine shed some light on yet another aspect of treaty inter-
pretation and enforcement.  While all of the different theories of 
the self-executing doctrine have played an important part in the 
history of treaty law, it is the final category, that of the private 
right of action, that seems to have attracted the most attention 
lately.  As another prominent legal scholar has pointed out, the 
recent pattern of Senate declarations that a treaty is non-self-
executing, and thus does not confer a private right of action on 
individuals, “threatens to subvert the constitutional treaty sys-
tem.”126  This problem most often arises in the case of human 
  
 123. Id.  For example in Patstone v. Pennsylvania the defendant, a foreign 
born Pennsylvania resident, was convicted under state law for owning a shot-
gun.  Patstone v. Pennsylvania, 232 U.S. 138 (1914).  The defendant asserted 
the defense that the statute violated a treaty between Italy and the United 
States.  Id.  While the Supreme Court recognized the defense under the 
treaty, it ultimately concluded that there was no conflict between the treaty 
and the state law.  Id. at 145.  Similarly in Kolovrat v. Oregon, the state filed 
petitions under its law for escheatment to obtain the land of an intestate de-
cedent whose only next of kin lived in Yugoslavia.  Kolovrat v. Oregon, 336 
U.S. 187 (1961).  The Yugoslavian relatives of the deceased argued that a 
treaty between the United States and Yugoslavia allowed for reciprocal rights 
of inheritance and that they were therefore eligible heirs to the estate.  Id.  
The Supreme Court agreed, holding that, under the treaty to inherit property, 
the next of kin did not have to reside in the United States.  Id. at 197.  See 
also de la Vega & Brown, supra note 50, at 763. 
 124. de la Vega, supra note 65, at 1056.   
 125. Reimels, supra note 5, at 316.   
 126. Henkin, supra note 59, at 348.  It is submitted that there is no justifi-
cation for using a non-self-executing declaration to preserve an inconsistent 
statute that predates the treaty because this practice would create an inde-
fensible gap between domestic law and international obligations.  Lori Fisler 
Damrosch, The Role of the United States Senate Concerning “Self-Executing” 
and “Non-Self-Executing” Treaties, 67 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 515, 530 (1991).  The 
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rights treaties where, in order to achieve the goals set forth in 
the treaty, the individual signatories must pass subsequent 
domestic legislation to conform to the treaty requirements.127  
This insufficiency can result in a whole class of non-self-
executing treaties whose main purpose is the protection of indi-
viduals who cannot create legislation to protect themselves.  
This shall be discussed in the next section examining treaties 
dealing with the juvenile death penalty.   
B. International Treaties Governing the Juvenile Death Penalty 
There are two central issues involved in any discussion of the 
domestic impact of an international human rights treaty: the 
legal implications of reservations and the status of the treaty as 
self-executing or non-self-executing.128  If one would like to in-
voke a provision of a treaty upon which a reservation has been 
attached, one must show that the reservation is invalid because 
it violates both the object and purpose of the treaty as well as 
the non-derogable nature of the provision.129  Moreover, if the 
reservation declares the treaty to be non-self-executing, it is 
necessary to introduce counterarguments asserting that the 
treaty is self-executing and enforceable because either the 
original intent of the parties was to make it self-executing and 
to directly confer rights on individuals, or regardless of the 
treaty’s self-executing nature its use as a defense is just.130   
Modern human rights treaties are not multilateral treaties of 
the traditional kind that are created to accomplish a reciprocal 
exchange of rights for the mutual benefit of the contracting 
  
effect of a non-self-executing declaration attached by the Senate to an other-
wise self-executing treaty would be to allow prior inconsistent statutory law to 
prevail, even though the courts would have allowed the treaty to supercede 
the statute in the absence of the declaration as a result of the last in time 
doctrine.  Id.   
 127. Cele Hancock, The Incompatibility of the Juvenile Death Penalty and 
the United Nation’s Convention on the Rights of the Child: Domestic and In-
ternational Concerns, 12 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 699, 715 (1995).  This is 
done because some countries, like Great Britain, require implementing legis-
lation for the execution of any treaty.   
 128. Reimels, supra note 5, at 316.   
 129. See also Christian A. Levesque, Note, The International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights: A Primer for Raising a Defense Against the Juvenile 
Death Penalty in Federal Courts, 50 AM. U. L. REV. 755, 782 (2001).   
 130. Id. at 792.   
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states.131  The object and purpose of these treaties is “the protec-
tion of the basic rights of individual human beings, irrespective 
of their nationality, both against the State of their nationality 
and all other contracting States.”132  In concluding human rights 
treaties, the party states submit themselves to a legal order by 
assuming various obligations, not in relation to other states, but 
for the common good of all individuals in their jurisdiction.133  
Multilateral treaties seldom make clear the mechanism by 
which parties are to incorporate their provisions into national 
law134 due to the fact that some countries require implementing 
legislation for all treaties whereas others, such as the United 
States, do not.135  Further, while few courts in the United States 
have considered whether human rights treaties are self-
executing,136 the test that applies to multilateral treaties137 of 
this nature is whether the treaty provision in question ad-
dresses the rights and duties of individuals and has extremely 
clear prohibitory language indicating that no further legislation 
is needed for it to take effect;138 if the treaty comports with these 
two requirements, then it is self-executing.   
With all of the previously discussed treaty law jurisprudence 
in mind, this Comment will now more closely examine interna-
  
 131. de la Vega & Brown, supra note 50, at 754.   
 132. Id.   
 133. Id. at 755.  See also Sherman, supra note 68, at 79–80.   
 134. de la Vega, supra note 76, at 449.   
 135. See supra n.75 and accompanying text for a further explanation of this 
topic.   
 136. de la Vega, supra note 76, at 450.  For example, the United States Su-
preme Court has not directly ruled on whether the United Nations Charter’s 
human rights clauses are self-executing.  Id.  However, in Oyama v. Califor-
nia four Justices did support the idea that the United Nations Charter should 
be binding on courts in the United States.  Id.  See also Oyama v. California, 
332 U.S. 633, 649–50 (1948) (Black, J., concurring).   
 137. Bourguignon, supra note 65, at 348.   
 138. See Connie de la Vega & Jennifer Fiore, The Supreme Court of the 
United States Has Been Called Upon to Determine the Legality of the Juvenile 
Death Penalty in Michael Domingues v. State of Nevada, 21 WHITTIER L. REV. 
215, 220 (1999).  See also de la Vega, supra note 76, at 449 (citing Stefan 
Riesenfeld, The Doctrine of Self-Executing Treaties and GATT: A Notable 
German Judgment, 65 AM. J. INT’L L. 548, 550 (1970)). Regardless of which 
test is applicable for use by the courts in determining whether a treaty is self-
executing, recently the United States has taken to declaring all the human 
rights agreements that it ratifies as non-self-executing.  Henkin, supra note 
59, at 346.   
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tional treaties that ban the execution of individuals who com-
mitted the crime, for which they were convicted and sentenced, 
while they were minors.  The United States is a party to two 
treaties that prohibit the execution of persons under the age of 
eighteen (either at the time of the crime and/or at the time of 
execution): the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (ICCPR) and the Fourth Geneva Convention Relative to 
the Protection of Civilians.  The United States is also a signa-
tory139 to the United Nations Convention of the Rights of the 
Child and the American Declaration of Human Rights.  Each 
treaty will be examined in turn; however, special attention will 
be given to the ICCPR because it has the greatest potential to 
be used as persuasive authority in juvenile death penalty de-
fense motions.140   
1. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
a. The United States Reservation to Article 6 of the  
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights  
is Invalid 
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR) has been categorized as “nothing less than an interna-
tional bill of rights [which was] part of an effort to codify the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the United Nations’ 
post-war proclamation of the rights of man.”141  In 1966, the 
United Nations General Assembly approved the text of the 
treaty and opened the ICCPR for ratification.142  President 
  
 139. A signatory to a treaty is a country that has signed the treaty but not 
yet ratified it.  While that State has not yet manifested its intent to be bound 
by the treaty though its ratification, the State is still required to comply with 
all the terms and provisions of the treaty.  Moreover, once a State signs a 
treaty it also agrees not to pass any laws that contradict the treaty provisions 
even though that treaty is technically not the law of the land until ratified.  
See de la Vega & Brown, supra note 50, at 759.   
 140. Reimels, supra note 5, at 317.   
 141. John Quigley, Criminal Law and Human Rights: Implications of the 
United States Ratification of the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights, 6 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 59, 59 (1993).   
 142. G.A. Res. 2200, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 52, U.N. Doc. 
A/6316 (1967).   
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Carter made the United States a treaty signatory143 and asked 
the Senate to give its advice and consent to ratification of the 
ICCPR in 1977.144  Nothing was done for the twenty-six years 
after the United Nations General Assembly unanimously 
adopted the treaty and the sixteen years after it went into effect 
internationally.  Then, on April 2, 1992 the ICCPR was ratified 
by the United States Senate, on June 8, 1992 President Bush 
deposited the signed ratification instrument with the United 
Nations Secretary General,145 and three months later on Sep-
tember 8, 1992 the treaty entered into force in the United 
States.146  Between 1966 and 1992, many Senate and executive 
administration debates were held dealing with the treaty, illus-
trating the tension between the United States’ commitment to 
human rights and its reluctance to implement the ICCPR into 
domestic law.147  As a result, when the United States finally rati-
fied the treaty it did so subject to several reservations, declara-
tions, and understandings.148  Eleven states filed objections to 
the reservations, asserting that they were invalid because they 
conflicted with the “object and purpose” of the ICCPR.149  Fur-
ther, the United Nations Human Rights Committee concluded 
that under the Vienna Convention, which is the guiding author-
ity on current treaty law,150 the United States’ reservation to 
  
 143. 13 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1488 (Oct. 5, 1977), reprinted in 77 DEP’T 
ST. BULL. Oct. 1977. 
 144. 14 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 395 (Feb. 23, 1978), reprinted in 78 DEP’T 
ST. BULL. Apr. 1978. 
 145. 28 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1008 (Sept. 10, 1992), reprinted in 92 
DEP’T ST. BULL. Sept. 1992.   
 146. See Senate Report, supra note 30, at 645.  See Quigley, supra note 141, 
at 60.   
 147. M. Cherif Bassiouni, Reflections on the Ratification of the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights by the United States Senate, 42 
DEPAUL L. REV. 1169, 1170–72 (1993).  See also United Nations, Multilateral 
Treaties Deposited with the Secretary General: Status as at 31 Dec. 1999, at 
134, U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER.E/18 (Vol. I) (1999) [hereinafter ICCPR Status 
Report].   
 148. ICCPR Status Report, supra note 147, at 134.  See also supra p. 1255 
n.45 and accompanying text on reservations, understandings, declarations, 
and provisos.   
 149. See id. at 144–48 (listing Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Ger-
many, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, and Sweden).  See 
also Schabas, supra note 59, at 277.   
 150. See supra text pp. 1254, 1256–59. 
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Article 6 is invalid because it contradicts the ICCPR’s “object 
and purpose.”151 
The ICCPR, like most human rights treaties, attempts to 
place legal obligations on how states handle the people living 
within their borders.152  The object and purpose of the ICCPR, 
and in particular Article 6, is to “protect the right to life 
through prohibiting the imposition of the death penalty on ju-
venile offenders.”153  Article 6 paragraph 5 states that the “sen-
tence of death shall not be imposed for crimes committed by 
persons below eighteen years of age.”154  The United States at-
tached a reservation to this provision of the treaty, stating that 
“the United States reserves the right, subject to its Constitu-
tional constraints, to impose capital punishment on any person 
[other than a pregnant woman] duly convicted under existing or 
future laws permitting the imposition of capital punishment 
including such punishment for crimes committed by persons 
below eighteen years of age.”155  Since a reservation is invalid if 
it contradicts the object and purpose of the treaty,156 the Senate 
reservation, which does just that, is void.   
The consequences of invalidating the reservation are two-fold.  
First, if an invalid reservation can be severed from the treaty as 
a whole, the United States remains bound by the entire 
treaty.157  Thus in the case of the ICCPR, the United States 
would be bound to the entire treaty including the prohibition 
against the execution of minors who are sixteen and seventeen 
at the time of their offense.158  The other possibility is that, in 
light of the reservation and subsequent objections, the United 
  
 151. de la Vega & Fiore, supra note 138, at 217–18.  See also Schabas, supra 
note 59, at 278 (citing Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties 
Under Article 40 of the Covenant: Comments of the Human Rights Committee; 
U.N. GAOR, Hum. Rts. Comm., 53d Sess., 1413th mtg. at 4, U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/79/Add.50 (1995) [hereinafter Comments of the Human Rights Com-
mittee regarding the ICCPR]).   
 152. Reimels, supra note 5, at 321.   
 153. de la Vega & Fiore, supra note 138, at 218.   
 154. ICCPR, supra note 4, art. 6, para. 5.   
 155. Senate Report, supra note 30, at 653.   
 156. Vienna Convention, supra note 33, at art. 19.  See also the accompany-
ing text.   
 157. Schabas, supra note 59, at 278.  See also Reimels, supra note 5, at 320.   
 158. Id.   
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States is no longer a party to the treaty.159  However, as a result 
of the “growing international consensus that an invalid reserva-
tion is severed from the ratification”160 and the corollary concept 
that the reserving State is still a party to the treaty, it can be 
concluded that the United States’ present practice of imposing 
capital punishment on juvenile offenders is illegal under the 
ICCPR, to which the United States is still a party. 
Moreover, the reservation to Article 6 of the ICCPR can be 
invalidated due to the fact that it attempts to annul that non-
derogable provision.  Article 4 paragraph 2 of the ICCPR states 
that “[n]o derogation from Articles 6, 7, 8 (paragraphs one and 
two), 11, 15, 16, and 18 may be made under this provision.”161  
The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights issued an 
opinion linking the non-derogable provisions of a treaty with 
the incompatibility principle of the Law of Nations.162  That 
Commission defined the incompatibility doctrine by stating that 
a reservation which violates a non-derogable fundamental right 
is incompatible with the object and purpose of the treaty and 
therefore is not permitted.163  Further, “implicit in the … opinion 
linking non-derogability and incompatibility is the view that 
the compatibility requirement has greater importance in hu-
man rights treaties, where reciprocity provides no protection for 
the individual against a reserving state.”164  More telling still is 
that the United Nations Human Rights Committee, which was 
established under the ICCPR and is another major interna-
tional organization dealing with the issue of the juvenile death 
penalty,165 declared the United States’ death penalty reservation 
to be invalid by concluding that some components of the reser-
  
 159. Id.   
 160. See generally Bourguignon, supra note 65.  See also Belilos Case, 132 
Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1988), reprinted in 10 Eur. H.R. Rep. 466 (1988) (hold-
ing that if a non-essential reservation is invalid it is severed and the country 
submitting the reservation is still a party to the treaty and bound by the pro-
vision without the reservation); de la Vega & Fiore, supra note 138, at 219.   
 161. ICCPR, supra note 4, art. 4, para. 2.   
 162. See Restrictions to the Death Penalty (Arts. 4(2) and 4(4) American 
Convention on Human Rights), Advisory Opinion No. OC-3/83 of Sept. 8, 1983, 
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., ser. A: Judgments and Opinions, No. 3 (1983), at 23 I.L.M. 
320 (1984).   
 163. See id. at 61, 23 I.L.M. at 341.  See also supra n.67.   
 164. Sherman, supra note 68, at 79.   
 165. See ICCPR, supra note 4, art. 28, para. 1.   
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vation may be incompatible with the non-derogable provision of 
the treaty that states its object and purpose.166  In conclusion, 
because the Senate’s reservation conflicts with the object and 
purpose of the treaty and is in fact in derogation from a non-
derogable provision it is void, thus signifying the non-
compliance of United States with its international obligations 
under Article 6.   
b. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights  
is Self-Executing 
In addition to the reservation to Article 6(5), in which the 
Senate attempted to maintain the right of the United States to 
impose the juvenile death penalty, the Senate declared that the 
ICCPR is non-self-executing, thus barring the use of any of the 
treaty provisions as a basis for private causes of action.167  How-
ever, by applying the self-executing treaty test for multilateral 
human rights treaties as well as the intent-based and justicia-
bility doctrines identified by Professor Vazquez, it becomes 
clear that the ICCPR should be categorized as a self-executing 
treaty.   
First, Article 6 paragraph 5 of the ICCPR is self-executing be-
cause it fulfills the conditions for multilateral human rights 
treaties, requiring that the provision involve the rights and du-
ties of individuals and that the prohibitory language be ex-
tremely clear, indicating that no further legislation is needed 
for it to take effect.168  The rights of individuals involved under 
this provision are those of juvenile offenders and the prohibitory 
language clearly states that the death penalty “shall not be im-
posed for crimes committed by persons below eighteen years of 
age.”169  Consequently, implementing legislation should not be 
necessary to put into operation the prohibition against the ju-
venile death penalty for parties to the ICCPR.170   
  
 166. See Comments of the Human Rights Committee regarding the ICCPR, 
supra note 151, at 3.  See also de la Vega & Brown, supra note 50, at 767 (cit-
ing de la Vega, supra note 76, at 461).   
 167. See ICCPR Senate Report, supra note 30, at 659.  See also Reimels, 
supra note 5, at 322.   
 168. de la Vega & Fiore, supra note 138, at 220.   
 169. ICCPR, supra note 4, at art. 6, para. 5.  See also id.   
 170. See de la Vega & Fiore, supra note 138, at 221.   
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Further, under the intent-based self-executing treaty doc-
trine,171 both the actual language and the meaning of the 
ICCPR, in addition to the surrounding circumstances of execut-
ing the treaty when the language is unclear, make it self-
executing.172  Article 2 paragraph 3(a) of the ICCPR states that, 
“[e]ach State Party to the present Covenant undertakes: [t]o 
ensure that any person whose rights or freedoms as herein rec-
ognized are violated shall have an effective remedy, notwith-
standing that the violation has been committed by persons act-
ing in an official capacity.”173  United States Senate Declaration 
1 of the ICCPR states that, “the provisions of articles 1 through 
27 of the Covenant are not self-executing.”174  Due to the fact 
that Article 2 of the ICCPR mandates that the United States 
create a system of enforcement, the Senate’s declaration, which 
lacks the full authority of a reservation,175 does not alleviate this 
obligation.176   
  
 171. See Section II.A.3 supra for an in depth explanation of the several self-
executing treaty doctrines set forth by Professor Vazquez.   
 172. See Air France v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392, 397 (1985) (noting that interpre-
tation of a treaty must begin with the text of the treaty and the context in 
which words are written and used (citing Maximov v. United States, 373 U.S. 
49, 53–54 (1963))); Choctaw Nation of Indians v. United States, 318 U.S. 423, 
431–32, (1943) (stating that courts should interpret treaties more liberally 
than private agreements and that the Court may look at history, negotiations, 
and practical construction so as to maintain the spirit of the treaty).  See also 
Levesque, supra note 129, at 772.   
 173. ICCPR, supra note 4, art. 2, para. 3(a).   
 174. ICCPR Status Report, supra note 147, declaration 1, at 139.  “Declara-
tions are simply statements of policy, purpose, or position relating to the sub-
ject matter of the treaty, but not necessarily affecting its provisions.”  de la 
Vega, supra note 76, at 452.   
 175. Quigley, supra note 141, at 64.  “The declaration has effect only insofar 
as it bears upon judicial appraisal of the Covenant’s force.  This appraisal is 
not a fait accompli; it is not clear how much weight the Senate’s declaration 
will carry on the courts.”  Id.  See, e.g., Power Authority of N.Y. v. Federal 
Power Comm’n, 247 F.2d 538 (D.C. Cir. 1957) (holding that a qualification 
statement made by the Senate in a resolution of consent to a treaty, but not 
made as a reservation, did not have the force of domestic law in the United 
States).   
 176. Id.  See also ICCPR, supra note 4, at art. 2, para. 3(b) (the parties agree 
to provided remedies enforceable “by competent judicial, administrative or 
legislative authorities, or by any other competent authority provided for by 
the legal system of the State, and to develop the possibility of judicial rem-
edy”).  Additionally, because the United States has not created an enforce-
ment mechanism in other branches of the government, the judiciary is “called 
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The ICCPR cannot be internationally binding and contain 
language invoking a remedy for individual violations and yet 
not create a basis for implementation domestically.177  However, 
since a discrepancy between the language and interpreted 
meaning of the ICCPR is created when reading the Senate’s 
Declaration in conjunction with Article 2, courts must look for 
intrinsic evidence surrounding the treaty’s execution to deter-
mine whether the treaty provision is in fact self-executing.178  
While the Senate’s Declaration that the treaty is non-self-
executing carries weight, the force ascribed to the ICCPR by 
other states provides substantial support to the notion that the 
parties to the treaty intended for it to be self-executing.179  For 
instance, the United Kingdom, a party to the ICCPR, has per-
mitted private causes of action under the treaty even though it 
has not expressly written the ICCPR into its domestic law as 
British law requires.180  Moreover, many other countries which 
are a party to the treaty have expressed the view that the 
ICCPR creates rights that are enforceable without enacting leg-
islation.181  Therefore, it is readily apparent that the other party 
states believe that direct causes of action are allowed under the 
ICCPR.  Admittedly, under the Restatement approach to treaty 
interpretations, the only intention considered in determining 
  
upon to enforce the ICCPR’s obligations.  Quigley, supra note 141, at 64.  Pro-
fessor Quigley opines that the courts should decide on this basis that the pre-
scriptive provisions of the Covenant are self-executing.”  Id.    
 177. Levesque, supra note 129, at 773.   
 178. Id.   
 179. See Quigley, supra note 141, at 64.   
 180. Id.  In the United Kingdom treaties are not the “law of the land,” as 
they are here under the Supremacy Clause.  Instead, there, a treaty must be 
explicitly transformed into law by an act of parliament in order to become 
domestic law.  See also supra n.75.   
 181. Id.  See, e.g., Report of the Human Rights Committee, U.N. GAOR, 
44th Sess., Supp. No. 44, at para. 194 (Netherlands stating that “any legisla-
tive act contrary to a provision of the Covenant would become inapplicable”); 
id. para. 549 (Italy stating that the ICCPR is frequently invoked by their 
courts).  Report on the Human Rights Committee, U.N. GAOR, 43rd Sess., 
Supp. No. 40, para. 368, U.N. Doc. A/43/40 (1988) (France stating that its 
courts rely on the ICCPR); id. at para. 588 (Japan stating that the ICCPR 
prevails over domestic legislation in Japanese courts). See also Cindy A. Cohn, 
The Early Harvest: Domestic Legal Changes Related to the Human Rights 
Committee and the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 13 HUM. RTS. Q. 
295, 317–20 (1991).   
File: Jen4.23.04macro.doc Created on:  4/23/2004 10:23 PM Last Printed: 6/25/2004 1:25 PM 
1278 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 29:3 
 
the self-executing question is that of the United States.182  How-
ever, “it is questionable [as to whether] in multilateral agree-
ments the intent of only one of the parties … determine[s] the 
effect of a particular clause.”183  Further, under the rule promul-
gated in Foster v. Nelson,184 which introduced the concept of the 
self-executing treaty doctrine, the intent of all the negotiating 
parties is most important; under that theory it would be clear 
that the ICCPR is self-executing.   
Moreover, the ICCPR should also be classified as self-
executing under the justiciability doctrine introduced by Profes-
sor Vazquez.  Under this doctrine, the self-executing question is 
determined based on independent factors and reasons, unre-
lated to intent, that illustrate why the treaty should or should 
not be judicially enforceable without implementing legislation.185  
These factors were fashioned by the court in Frolova v. USSR186 
and should act as a guideline and not a rigid test of self-
execution.187  However, by applying the factors to Article 6 para-
graph 5 of the ICCPR they lead to the conclusion that it is self-
executing.  First, the language, object, and purpose of the treaty 
in its entirety are clear: it intends to protect the human rights 
of individuals.188  Second, as noted before, the circumstances 
surrounding the execution of the treaty indicate that it is self-
executing due to the fact that many parties to the ICCPR have 
allowed private rights of action under the treaty without first 
enacting implementing legislation.189  Third, Article 2 unmis-
takably imposes an obligation on party states to supply effective 
remedies.190  Fourth, because the United States has not ratified 
the Optional Protocol to the Convention on Civil and Political 
  
 182. RESTATEMENT, supra note 36, § 111 cmt.h.  See also Reimels, supra 
note 5, at 322.   
 183. de la Vega, supra note 76, at 448.  See also United States v. Toscanino, 
550 F.2d 267, 270 (2d. Cir. 1974).   
 184. Foster v. Nelson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 51 (1833).   
 185. Vazquez, supra note 75, at 711.   
 186. Frolova v. Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 761 F.2d 370 (7th Cir. 
1985).  For a more in-depth discussion of the factors see n.96 on p. 1264.   
 187. Levesque, supra note 129, at 772.   
 188. See ICCPR, supra note 4.  See also de la Vega, supra note 65, at 1055.   
 189. Quigley, supra note 141, at 64.  See also supra n.180 and accompanying 
text.   
 190. ICCPR, supra note 4, at art. 2, para. 3.  See also de la Vega, supra note 
65, at 1055.   
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Rights, which provides for an individual right to petition the 
Human Rights Committee,191 there are no other enforcement or 
implementation mechanisms available.192  Fifth, since the treaty 
provides rights to individuals, there is no reason to “believe that 
individuals should not have a private cause of action to enforce 
the provisions.”193  Lastly, as there is no other enforcement 
mechanism in any other branch of the United States govern-
ment, this job falls to the judiciary.194  The judiciary is the most 
capable institution for addressing the question of whether a 
treaty has been violated because it has customarily been the 
means through which individuals in the United States have 
enforced their constitutional rights.195  Thus, under the Frolova 
factors of the justiciability variant of the self executing treaty 
doctrine, the ICCPR should be self-executing.196 
Furthermore, despite the clarity of the ICCPR provisions, if 
the Senate Declaration that the treaty is non-self-executing is 
given effect then it should only apply to private causes of action.  
When the Senate Foreign Relations Committee declared the 
ICCPR to be non-self-executing, it did so only with respect “to 
  
 191. G.A. Res. 2200A, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 59, U.N. Doc. 
A/6316 (1966) (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976; not in force for the United 
States), 999 U.N.T.S. 302.   
 192. de la Vega, supra note 65, at 1055 
 193. Id.   
 194. Quigley, supra note 141, at 64.   
 195. de la Vega, supra note 65, at 1055.  It is important to remember that 
the courts and not the Senate usually decide when treaty provisions are self-
executing.  See Anne Bayefsky & Joan Fitzpatrick, International Human 
Rights Law in United States Courts: A Comparative Perspective, 14 MICH. J. 
INT’L L. 1, 42–47 (1992); Damrosch, supra note 126, at 526; David Weissbrodt, 
The United States Ratification of the Human Rights Covenants, 63 MINN. L. 
REV. 35, 67 (1978).   
 196. While they are somewhat weaker arguments, the ICCPR might also be 
considered self-executing under the constitutionality and private right of ac-
tion self-executing treaty doctrines.  First, under the constitutionality doc-
trine, banning the execution of minors does not appear to be a goal that lies 
exclusively within the lawmaking powers of Congress.  Therefore, under that 
limited doctrine the ICCPR may be self executing.  Secondly, while the con-
cepts of a private right of action and the self-execution of a treaty are distinct, 
according to Professor Vazquez, one can consider the provision of a private 
right of action through a treaty informative regarding its self-executing na-
ture.  The ICCPR appears to provide a private right of action, thus it should 
be considered self-executing.  For more information regarding these variants 
on the self-executing treaty doctrine, see supra Section II.A.3.   
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private causes of action.”197  The legislative history of the decla-
ration does not make the same statement regarding the use of 
the ICCPR provisions as a defense; thus because a party seek-
ing to invoke the treaty provision, such as Article 6 paragraph 
5, is not invoking a separate cause of action, the non-self-
executing declaration is inapplicable to such parties.198  Human 
rights treaties are different from other treaties in that parties 
to human rights treaties agree to protect individuals within 
their jurisdictions, whereas parties to other treaties create state 
to state obligations;199 therefore, if a right is created in a human 
rights treaty but there is no corresponding private right of ac-
tion to enforce it domestically then there will be an individual 
right without a remedy — that is unless the treaty can be used 
defensively.  Moreover, “the defensive use of a treaty is a judi-
cially accepted means by which litigants have been successful in 
enforcing treaty provisions without [forcing the courts] to de-
termine whether the treaty is self-executing.”200  Accordingly, 
  
 197. S. Exec. Rep. No. 102-23, at 19, reprinted in 31 I.L.M. at 657 (“For the 
reasons of prudence, we recommend including a declaration that the substan-
tive provisions of the Covenant are not self-executing.  The intent is to clarify 
that the Covenant will not create a private cause of action in U.S. courts.”).  
See also Levesque, supra note 129, at 775.   
 198. de la Vega & Brown, supra note 50, at 763.   
 199. Id.   
 200. de la Vega & Fiore, supra note 138, at 221.  The seminal case regarding 
this theory is United States v. Rauscher, in which the Supreme Court “implic-
itly held that a direct beneficiary of a treaty may invoke that treaty as a de-
fense even if the defendant was an unintended beneficiary or the treaty does 
not expressly grant the defendant or individuals in his class any rights.”  
United States v. Rauscher, 119 U.S. 407, 432–33 (1886) (The defendant had 
been extradited from Great Britain to the United States for allegedly murder-
ing a crewmember aboard an American vessel.  However, when he was 
brought to the United States he was not charged with murder but with inflict-
ing cruel and unusual punishment upon a crew member.).   There the Court 
focused on the defendant’s use of the extradition treaty as a defense and only 
indirectly discussed the issue of self-executing treaties.  Id. at 420.  The Court 
held that treaties confer certain rights on private citizens when the treaty 
prescribes a rule governing a right that is “of the nature” of rights enforceable 
in the courts.  Id. at 419.  Thus the defendant had a right to raise the treaty 
as a defense because the Court did not have jurisdiction over those offenses 
that fell beyond the scope of the treaty under which he was extradited.  Id. at 
430.  Further, even the dissent in Rauscher supported the contention that an 
individual may raise a treaty as a defense to a prosecution; it only disagreed 
with the actual interpretation of the treaty in question in the case.  Id. at 434 
(Waite, C.J., dissenting).  See also Levesque, supra note 129, at 777. 
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juvenile offenders sentenced to death should be allowed to use 
Article 6 paragraph 5 of the ICCPR as a defense to challenge 
the imposition of the juvenile death penalty.   
Thus, since the Senate reservation to Article 6 paragraph 5 of 
the ICCPR is invalid based on the fact that it conflicts with the 
object and purpose of the treaty and the fact that the Senate 
Declaration of non-self-execution is both contrary to the intent 
of the parties and inapplicable when the treaty is invoked as a 
defense, the ICCPR should be called upon in cases dealing with 
the juvenile death penalty.  Without bypassing the Senate res-
ervation and declaration, the United States adherence to the 
ICCPR remains essentially empty by keeping United States 
judges from ruling on domestic human rights conditions using 
the more stringent international standards.201   
2.  The Fourth Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of 
Civilian Persons in Time of War 
The first treaty that the United States ratified that explicitly 
prohibited the application of the death penalty to juvenile of-
fenders was the Fourth Geneva Convention Relative to the Pro-
tection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (Fourth Geneva Con-
vention).202  The Fourth Geneva Conventions are the most 
widely ratified treaties in the history of the modern world.203  
The United States is a party to this treaty which was both 
signed and ratified in 1949.204  Article 68 of the Fourth Geneva 
Convention states that “[i]n any case, the death penalty may 
not be pronounced against a protected person [held by a party 
to the conflict or an occupying force of which he or she is not a 
national] who was under eighteen years of age at the time of the 
offence [sic].”205  While the Fourth Geneva Convention applies 
only in times of international armed conflict, it is important to 
note that it prohibits the execution of juvenile offenders.  The 
United States did submit a reservation to Article 68,206 but in-
  
 201. Henkin, supra note 59, at 346.   
 202. Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 4, at art. 68.   
 203. See Reimels, supra note 5, at 322.  186 States are parties to the 1949 
Geneva Convention.  Id.     
 204. Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 4, at art. 68.   
 205. Id.   
 206. Schabas, supra note 59, at 305–06.  Article 68, paragraph 2 stating 
that the death penalty “may not be imposed in wartime on civilian popula-
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terestingly it was not to the prohibition of the juvenile death 
penalty.207 
Additionally, the 1977 Protocols to the Geneva Conventions 
explicitly prohibit the imposition of capital punishment on those 
who committed the crimes that they were convicted of while 
they were minors under the age of eighteen.208  The Additional 
Protocol relating to the Protection of Victims of International 
Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) states in Article 77 paragraph 5 
that “the death penalty related to the armed conflict shall not 
be executed on persons who had not attained the age of eight-
een years at the time the offence [sic] was committed.”209  The 
Additional Protocol relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-
  
tions by an occupying power if it has previously been abolished in peacetime” 
has been the only provision in the Fourth Geneva Convention to provoke res-
ervations.  Id.  See also Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 4, at art. 68 
para. 2.  Reservations were filed by the United States, Australia, Canada, the 
United Kingdom, New Zealand, and the Netherlands for the purpose of pro-
tecting “… the right to impose the death penalty in accordance with the provi-
sions of Article 68, paragraph 2, without regard to whether the offenses re-
ferred to therein are punishable by death under the law of the occupied terri-
tory at the time the occupation begins.”  Id. at 432.   
 207. Id.  This may have been due to the fact that at the time of the signing 
and ratification of the Geneva Convention the United States federal govern-
ment had a de facto moratorium on its use of the death penalty against juve-
nile offenders.   See Ved P. Nanda, The United States Reservation to the Ban 
on the Death Penalty for Juvenile Offenders: An Appraisal under the Interna-
tional Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 42 DEPAUL L. REV. 1311, 1332 
(1993).  See also VICTOR L. STREIB, DEATH PENALTY FOR JUVENILES 55 (Bloom-
ington, IN: Indiana University Press) (1987).  Additionally, it was not until 
1962 that the United States Supreme Court ruled that the Cruel and Unusual 
Punishments Clause of the Eighth Amendment was applicable to the states 
through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.  Nanda, su-
pra note 207, at 1318.  Therefore, until that time the state supreme courts 
heard most, if not all challenges to the death penalty.  Id.  Then, significantly, 
between 1964 and 1985, the United States did not execute any persons for 
crimes committed while under eighteen years of age.  Id.   
 208. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Convention of 12 August 1949, and 
Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Proto-
col I), adopted June 8, 1977, art. 77, para. 5, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3, 39 (entered into 
force Dec. 7, 1978; not in force in the United States); Protocol Additional to the 
Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Vic-
tims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), adopted June 8, 1977, 
art. 6, para. 4, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609, 613–14 (entered into force Dec. 7, 1978; not 
in force in the United States) [hereinafter Protocol II].  See also Nanda, supra 
note 207, at 1330.   
 209. Id. at art 77, para 5, at 39.     
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International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II) states in Article 6 
paragraph 4 that “the death penalty shall not be pronounced on 
persons who were under the age of eighteen years at the time of 
the offence [sic] ….”210  Despite the United States’ tacit en-
dorsement of the prohibition against the juvenile death penalty 
by ratifying the Fourth Geneva Convention, it did not become a 
party to the Additional Protocols of 1977.211  While the Fourth 
Geneva Convention, to which the United States is a party, only 
applies to times of international armed conflict and the Addi-
tional Protocols of 1997 were not accepted by the United States, 
the provisions within those instruments dealing with the juve-
nile death penalty illustrate the international consensus for the 
prohibition of the death penalty on juvenile offenders.212 
3. The United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child 
The United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child 
(CRC) is the first international human rights treaty specifically 
devoted to children.213  On November 20, 1989, the General As-
sembly of the United Nations adopted the CRC,214 a treaty that 
consists of fifty-four articles and provides the children of the 
international community with “civil, political, economic, social 
and cultural rights.”215  The United States signed the CRC in 
February of 1995216 and is one of only two counties worldwide, 
the other being Somalia — a country without a government, 
  
 210. Protocol II, supra note 208, art. 6, para. 4, at 613–14.   
 211. Id.  See also Reimels, supra note 5, at 324–25.   
 212. This will be very important in the later discussion of customary inter-
national law and jus cogens norms.  See infra pp. 1288–1298.   
 213. Jennifer D. Tinkler, Note, The Juvenile Justice System in the United 
States and the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, 12 B.C. 
THIRD WORLD L.J. 469, 470 (1992).  See also Per Miljeteig-Olssen, Advocacy of 
Children’s Rights – The Convention as More than a Legal Document, 12 HUM. 
RTS. Q.148, 148 (1990).   
 214. The treaty came into force on September 2, 1990.  CRC, supra note 4, 
at 44 n.1.   
 215. Tinkler, supra note 213, at 469.  See also Michael Jupp, The UN Con-
vention on the Rights of the Child: An opportunity for Advocates, 12 HUM. RTS. 
Q. 130, 130 (1990).   
 216. See The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Press Release, Feb. 
10, 1995.  See also de la Vega & Fiore, supra note 138, at 224.   
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which has not yet ratified the treaty.217  The sentiment reflected 
in the CRC is “that every child deprived of liberty be treated in 
a manner which takes into account the needs of persons of his 
or her age [and] calls for a variety of dispositions in criminal 
convictions that ensure children are dealt with in a manner ap-
propriate to their well-being [that is] proportionate to the cir-
cumstances of their offense.”218   
Article 37 of the CRC specifies the rights that children enjoy 
when they are deprived of their liberty, including rights granted 
to children after they are convicted or adjudicated delinquent.219  
That provision of the CRC explicitly abolishes capital punish-
ment and life imprisonment without the possibility of release 
for juvenile offenders.220  Article 37 section (a) states that “[n]o 
child shall be subjected to torture or other cruel, inhuman, or 
degrading treatment or punishment.  Neither capital punish-
ment nor life imprisonment without possibility of parole shall 
be imposed for offences [sic] committed by persons below eight-
een years of age.”221  Further, Article 18 of the Vienna Conven-
tion requires a government that has signed, but not yet ratified, 
a treaty “to refrain from acts which would defeat the object and 
purpose of [the] treaty … until it shall have made its intentions 
clear not to become a party.”222  Similarly, under the Restate-
ment “[p]rior to the entry into force of an international agree-
ment, a state that has signed the agreement or expressed its 
consent to be bound is obliged to refrain from acts that would 
defeat the object and purpose of the agreement.”223  Therefore, 
  
 217. de la Vega & Brown, supra note 50, at 753.  See also Rights of the 
Child: Status of the Convention on the Rights of the Child, U.N. ESCOR, 
Commision on Human Rights, 57th Sess., Agenda Item 13, at 2, Annex I, U.N. 
Doc. E/CN.4/2001/74 (2000).   
 218. Barbra Frey, International Standards and the Execution of Juvenile 
Defendants, 22 AM. J. CRIM. L. 261, 262 (1994).   
 219. Tinkler, supra note 213, at 476.   
 220. Hancock, supra note 127, at 699.   
 221. CRC, supra note 4, at art. 37(a), at 55.    
 222. Vienna Convention, supra note 33, at art. 18(a).  As mentioned before, 
while the United States is not a party to the Vienna Convention the 
RESTATEMENT has adopted most of the language of the treaty.  See supra text 
accompanying n.36.  Therefore, Article 18(a) of the Vienna Convention applies 
to the CRC.   
 223. RESTATEMENT, supra note 36, § 312(a) & cmt. i.  But see RESTATEMENT, 
supra note 36, § 312 cmt. d (stating that signatures are subject to later ratifi-
cation of the treaty and thus have no binding effect on the State; however, 
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the United States is obligated to adhere to the object and pur-
pose of the CRC to protect the youth from harm including that 
of the most severe kind — the death penalty.  224   
Moreover, it is significant that during the drafting of the 
CRC, there were four areas covered in the treaty that were con-
sidered controversial issues in the international community; 
those issues included “the rights of the unborn child, the right 
to foster care and adoption, freedom of religion, and the mini-
mum age for participation in armed conflict.”225  The juvenile 
death penalty was noticeably lacking in that list of controversial 
issues.226  Thus, in considering the large number of states that 
have ratified and actively observed the CRC, in addition to the 
fact that as a signatory to the treaty the United States has an 
obligation to uphold its principles, this treaty should also be 
applicable as a defense to criminal prosecutions of juvenile de-
fendants.  Further, this international consensus gives even 
more credence to the notion that the United States is violating 
customary international law because the juvenile death penalty 
is contrary to the practices of most other states.   
4. The American Declaration of Human Rights 
The last treaty to be examined in this Comment is the Ameri-
can Convention on Human Rights (American Convention).227  
This agreement was adopted in 1970228 and states, in pertinent 
  
they are considered to represent political approval and at least a moral obliga-
tion to ratify and adhere to the treaty by not passing domestic laws adverse to 
its object and purpose).   
 224. de la Vega & Fiore, supra note 138, at 224.  Furthermore, the death 
penalty differs from all other types of criminal punishment, not in degree but 
in kind.  Tinkler, supra note 213, at 494.  It is unique in its total irrevocabil-
ity, it is unique in its rejection of rehabilitation of the convict (which is central 
to juvenile justice) and it is unique in its absolute renunciation of all that is 
embodied in our concept of humanity.  Id.  See also Furman v. Georgia, 408 
U.S. 238, 306 (1972) (Stewart, J., concurring).  Thus we must be extra careful 
when attempting to impose the death penalty on minors, who by the very 
nature of their age, are not assumed to have the maturity to be held liable for 
all of their actions.    
 225. Cynthia Price Cohen, United Nations: Convention on the Rights of the 
Child: Introductory Note, 28 I.L.M. 1448, 1450 (1989).   
 226. Reimels, supra note 5, at 323–24.   
 227. American Convention, supra note 4, at art. 4, para. 5. 
 228. See American Convention on Human Rights, O.A.S. Official Records, 
OEA/Ser. K/XVI/1.1, doc. 65, rev. 1 corr. 2 (1970).   
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part, that “[c]apital punishment shall not be imposed upon per-
sons who, at the time the crime was committed, were under 18 
years of age ….”229  Despite being heavily involved in the draft-
ing of the agreement the United States is one of only two mem-
bers of the Organization of American States (OAS), which is 
made up of twenty-four member states,230 that has signed but 
not yet ratified the American Convention.231  During the draft-
ing phase, the United States did not object to the prohibition of 
the execution of juvenile offenders in the American Conven-
tion.232  Instead, the United States argued against setting a spe-
cific age limit because of the “already existent trend” toward the 
abolition of the death penalty altogether.233  Due to the fact that 
the drafting Conference would not remove the proscription of 
capital punishment for certain age groups the United States 
abstained on Article 4, which dealt with the juvenile death pen-
alty.234  Interestingly, of the twenty-four OAS member States 
only Barbados made a reservation to Article 4(5), and even they 
“brought themselves into line” in 1994.235 
Moreover, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights 
(Inter-American Commission), which was established under the 
  
 229. American Convention, supra note 4, at art. 4, para. 5, at 146. 
 230. The Organization of American States maintains a list of signatories 
and ratifications to the American Convention, available at http://www.oas.org 
(last visited on Apr. 16, 2004).   
 231. de la Vega, supra note 65, at 1046.   
 232. See Brief of Amicus Curiae Amnesty International in Support of Peti-
tioner, Wilkins v. Missouri, 492 U.S. 361 (1989).   
 233. Id.  See also Nanda, supra note 207, at 1328.   
 234. Nanda, supra note 207, at 1329.  See also American Convention on 
Human Rights, O.A.S. Official Records, OEA/Ser. K/XVI 1.1, doc. 65 rev. 1 
con. 1 (1970).   
 235. de la Vega, supra note 65, at 1046.  When Barbados ratified the Ameri-
can Convention in 1982, it made a reservation to article 4, paragraph 5 stat-
ing that “while youth or old age may be factors to be considered by the Privy 
Council in deciding whether the death penalty should be carried out, Barbad-
ian legislation allowed the execution of persons over sixteen and set no upper 
age limit.”  Schabas, supra note 59, at 303.  Similarly, Trinidad and Tobago 
ratified the American Convention with a reservation to article 4, paragraph 5 
noting that its laws do not prohibit the execution of a person over age seventy.  
Id. at 304.  Significantly, Professor Schabas points out that the reservations 
by Barbados and Trinidad and Tobago only attempted “to account for existing 
legislation not in line with the international obligations being undertaken, 
[they were] not aimed at preserving a state’s freedom to maneuver on the 
question [of the death penalty] in the future.”  Id.   
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American Convention and is another branch of the OAS,236 has 
ruled on the juvenile death penalty in the United States.  While 
the United States is not party to the American Convention, it is 
still subject to the provisions of the American Declaration of 
Human Rights and the recommendations of the Inter-American 
Commission because it is a member of the OAS as well as a sig-
natory of the Charter of the OAS.237  The Inter-American Com-
mission was concerned with the differences in United States 
state laws regarding the execution of minors and ruled that “by 
leaving [these] decisions … to state legislatures, the United 
States [was creating] a patchwork pattern of legislation whose 
arbitrariness violated [the] rights to life and equality before the 
law.”238  Indeed, the Inter-American Commission in 1987 found 
that the United States was in violation of a rule of jus cogens by 
its practice of executing juvenile offenders.239 
Therefore, in examining the four treaties that the United 
States has either ratified — the ICCPR and the Fourth Geneva 
Convention — or signed — the CRC and the American Conven-
  
 236. The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (Inter-American 
Commission) is the body responsible for the protection of fundamental free-
doms, through the implementation of the American Declaration, in the Or-
ganization of American States, of which the United States is a member.  de la 
Vega, supra note 65, at 1045.  See also American Convention, supra note 4, at 
arts. 52–73 (discussing how the Commission has dealt with the United State’s 
practice of executing juvenile offenders).  Id.   
 237. Schabas, supra note 59, at 323.   
 238. Quigley, supra note 141, at 75.  See also Terry Roach and Jay 
Pinkerton v. United States, Res. No. 3/87, Case 9647, Inter-Am. C.H.R., 925th 
Sess., Mar. 27, 1987.  This case involved the executions of James Terry Roach 
and Jay Pinkerton who were both seventeen at the time of their crimes.  Mr. 
Roach and Mr. Pinkerton filed a complaint requesting the Inter-American 
Commission consider whether their impending executions violated the Ameri-
can Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man prohibiting the execution of 
juveniles.  de la Vega & Brown, supra note 50, at 765.  The Inter-American 
Commission was most concerned with the fact that each state had its own 
laws on capital punishment and minimum ages therfor and thus stated that 
the inconsistent sentencing reflected the location of the crime more than its 
nature.  Nanda, supra note 207, at 1330.  “Although the Commission did not 
determine whether the United States had violated customary international 
law or was bound by article 4 paragraph 5 of the American Convention, the 
Commission did find that the United States practice violated a newly emerged 
peremptory norm of international law.”  de la Vega & Brown, supra note 50, 
at 765.   
 239. de la Vega & Brown, supra note 50, at 765.   
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tion — there appears to be a substantial international consen-
sus advocating for the abolition of the use of capital punishment 
on juvenile offenders.  To that end, part III of this Comment 
will now focus on examining the international consensus ban-
ning the juvenile death penalty.   
III. THE CONCEPT OF THE ABOLITION OF THE JUVENILE DEATH 
PENALTY HAS REACHED THE LEVEL OF CUSTOMARY 
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND MAY HAVE EVEN REACHED THE 
LEVEL OF A JUS COGENS NORM 
A. Customary International Law as Applied to the Juvenile 
Death Penalty 
Customary international law is “an emerging form of interna-
tional law and is considered by some to be the equivalent [of] 
treaty law or federal common law.”240  It is defined as law that 
“results from a general and consistent practice of states fol-
lowed by them from a sense of legal obligation.”241  Human 
rights obligations in customary international law generally are 
obligations to other countries for the benefit of individuals in-
cluding nationals, residents, and others subject to the jurisdic-
tion of the promisor country.242  Moreover, the customary inter-
national law of human rights is part of the law of the United 
States and must be applied as such by both the state and fed-
eral courts.243  In order for a treaty obligation to evolve to the 
level of customary international law, the treaty clause must be 
a norm creating provision or one which has generated a rule 
that has since passed into the general corpus of international 
law, such that it is binding even for countries which are not a 
  
 240. Hancock, supra note 127, at 718.   
 241. RESTATEMENT, supra note 36, § 102(2).  The practice of the states re-
ferred to in §102(2) that is necessary to create customary international law 
may be of comparatively short duration, but it must be “general and consis-
tent.”  Id. §102 cmt. b.  A practice can be general even if it is not universally 
followed and there is no precise formula to indicate how widespread a practice 
must be, “but it should reflect a wide acceptance among the states particularly 
involved in the relevant activity.”  Id.  (emphasis added).  If a significant num-
ber of states do not adopt the practice it may be prevented from becoming 
general customary international law.  Id.   
 242. RESTATEMENT, supra note 36, § 701 cmt. c.   
 243. RESTATEMENT, supra note 36, § 702 cmt. e.   
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party to the treaty.244  Thus, there are two criteria that must be 
fulfilled before a provision is considered customary law: (1) the 
provision or prohibition must be state practice evidenced by 
long-term, widespread compliance by many states; and (2) the 
provision or prohibition must be opinio juris, meaning that 
states must believe that compliance with the standard is not 
merely desired but is mandatory and required by international 
law.245 
Enough evidence exists to deem the prohibition on imposing 
capital punishment on juvenile offenders a customary interna-
tional law norm.246  The first element of the customary interna-
tional law doctrine, state practice, which requires widespread 
acceptance of the abolition of capital punishment for juvenile 
offenders, is easily established by the fact that scarcely any 
countries in the world currently retain the juvenile death pen-
alty.247  Only eight countries worldwide have executed juvenile 
offenders since 1990; those countries include China, the Democ-
ratic Republic of the Congo, Nigeria, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, 
Yemen, Iran, and the United States.248  Besides those nations, 
  
 244. See North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (F.R.G. v. Dem; F.R.G. v. 
Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 3.  The passage cited to was from the International Court 
of Justices case and was referring to Article 6 of the Geneva Convention of 
1958 regarding the principal of equidistance.  See also Reimels, supra note 5, 
at 329.   
 245. de la Vega & Brown, supra note 50, at 756.  See also Lynn Loschin, The 
Persistent Objector and Customary Human Rights Law: A Proposed Analytical 
Framework, 2 U.C. DAVIS J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 148, 148 (1996).   
 246. Id. at 757.   
 247. See id.  See also Victor L. Streib, The Juvenile Death Penalty Today: 
Death Sentences and Executions for Juvenile Crimes, January 1, 1973 – De-
cember 31, 2003, (Dec. 31, 2002), available at http://www.law.onu. 
edu/faculty/streib/juvdeath.htm (last visited Apr. 16, 2004).  One-hundred-
seventeen countries are abolitionists either by law or by practice, whereas 
only seventy-eight countries are retentionist with regard to the death penalty 
(and only eight countries practice the juvenile death penalty).  Amnesty In-
ternational, The Death Penalty: List of Abolitionist and Retentionist Countries 
(Feb. 1, 2004) (AI Index: ACT 50/005/2004), available at http://www.web 
.amnesty.org/library/index/engact500052004?open (last visited Apr. 16, 2004). 
 248. See Amnesty International, Stop Child Executions!  Ending the Death 
Penalty for Child Offenders (Jan. 2, 2004) (AI Index: ACT 50/001/2004), avail-
able at http://www.web.amnesty.org/library/index/engact500012004?open (last 
visited Apr. 16, 2004).  See also Juvenile Death Penalty in Other Countries, 
Death Penalty Info. Center (Aug. 30, 2002), available at http://www.death 
penaltyinfo.org/juvintl.html (last visited Apr. 16, 2004); Amnesty Interna-
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all other countries have either de facto abolished the juvenile 
death penalty or enacted legislation to prohibit the execution of 
juvenile offenders.249  The United Nations reported that Yemen, 
Barbados, and Zimbabwe changed their law and increased the 
death penalty age to eighteen in 1994,250 and China and Nigeria 
followed suit in 1997.251  Pakistan promulgated the Juvenile 
Justice System Ordinance in July of 2000 and in 2001, in fur-
therance of the new law banning the death penalty for anyone 
under eighteen at the time of the crime, Pakistan’s President 
Musharraf commuted the death sentences of one-hundred 
young offenders to imprisonment.252   
Significantly, even though there have been recent reports of 
juvenile offender executions in Pakistan (1 in 2001), Nigeria (1 
in 1997), Saudi Arabia (1 in 1992), the Democratic Republic of 
the Congo (1 in 2000), Iran (1 in 2004), and China (1 in 2003),253 
most if not all of these countries have either adamantly denied 
any execution took place or that a minor was sentenced to 
death.254  These denials are so important because they “indicate 
  
tional, Democratic Republic of Congo: Killing Human Decency 12 (2000) (AI 
Index: AFR 62/007/2000), available at http://www.web.amnesty.org/li-
brary/index/engafr620072000?open (last visited Apr. 16, 2004).   
 249. de la Vega & Fiore, supra note 138, at 222.   
 250. Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice: Capital Punishment and the 
Implementation of the Safeguards Guaranteeing Protection of the Rights of 
Those Facing the Death Penalty: Report of the Secretary General, U.N. 
ESCOR, Subst. Sess., para. 21, 90, U.N. Doc. E/2000/3 (2000). 
 251. Id.  
 252. See Amnesty International, Report 2001 186 (2001) (AI Index: POL 
10/001/2001); Juvenile Justice Systems Ordinance 2000, available at 
http://1hrla.sdnpk.org/link/jul_oct00/JUVENILE _ORDINANCE.HTML (last 
visited Apr. 16, 2004).  See also Press Release, Amnesty International Irish 
Section, Pakistan: Young Offenders Taken Off Death Row (Dec. 13, 2001), 
available at http://www.amnesty.ie/new/2001/pakistan4.shtml (last visited 
Apr. 16, 2004). 
 253. Amnesty International, Children and the Death Penalty: Executions 
Worldwide Since 1990 (2002) (AI Index: ACT 50/007/2002), available at 
http://www.web.amnesty.org/library/index/engact500072002?open (last visited 
Apr. 16, 2004). 
 254. See Amnesty International, Children and the Death Penalty: Execu-
tions Worldwide Since 1990 (2000) (AI Index: ACT 50/010/2000), available at 
http://www.web.amnesty.org/library/index/engact500102002?open (last visited 
Apr. 16, 2004).  See also United Press International, May 29, 2001 (AI Index: 
ACT 53/003/2001), available at http://www.web.amnesty.org/library/index/ 
 
File: Jen4.23.04macro.doc Created on: 4/23/2004 10:23 PM Last Printed: 6/25/2004 1:25 PM 
2004]  MINORS AND THE DEATH PENALTY  1291 
 
that those countries have in fact accepted the customary inter-
national norm” prohibiting the execution of juvenile offenders.255  
Hence, only the United States has not accepted the norm 
against the execution of juvenile offenders,256 thus the first crite-
rion of state practice is satisfied. 
The second criterion for customary international law de-
mands that nations prohibiting the juvenile death penalty do so 
because they believe that such a proscription is mandatory and 
required by customary international law.257  This second ele-
ment, opinio juris, is more complicated but possible to estab-
lish.258  As discussed above, at least four international agree-
ments expressly prohibit the execution of juvenile offenders: the 
ICCPR Article 6 paragraph 5, the Fourth Geneva Convention 
Article 68, the CRC Article 37, and the American Convention 
  
engact530032001?open, (regarding the execution of a minor in Iran in 2001) 
(last visited Apr. 16, 2004); Amnesty International, Report 2002 (May 28, 
2002) (AI Index: POL 10/001/002), available at http://www.web.amnesty.org/ 
library/index/engpol10001002?open (last visited Apr. 16, 2004).   
 255. de la Vega, supra note 65, at 1047.   
 256. Capital punishment has been abolished in the United States in thir-
teen states.  Streib, supra note 247, at 8.  However, forty jurisdictions in the 
United States still authorize the death penalty for capital crimes.  Id. at 7.  Of 
those forty jurisdictions consisting of thirty-eight states and the federal gov-
ernment (both civilian and military) authorizing the death penalty, nineteen  
jurisdictions (48%) have expressly mandated that a criminal must be eighteen 
years-of-age at the time that they committed the crime to be sentenced to 
death.  Id.  The other twenty-one death penalty jurisdictions permit the exe-
cution of individuals who were convicted of crimes they committed while they 
were sixteen or seventeen years-of-age.  Id.  However, in the United States 
since 1976 when the juvenile death penalty was reintroduced to American 
jurisprudence, only twenty-two people have been executed for crimes that they 
committed as minors.  Id. at 4.  Of these twenty-two executions, Texas has 
accounted for thirteen (59%), Virginia for three (14%), and Oklahoma for two 
(9%).  Id. at 6.  Thus, these three states are responsible for 81% of all juvenile 
executions and no other state has executed a criminal convicted of a crime 
that they committed as a minor for the past ten years.  Id.  This shows that, 
like the international community, there is no domestic consensus approving of 
the juvenile death penalty.   
 257. de la Vega & Fiore, supra note 138, at 221–22.  See also Allyssa D. 
Wheaton-Rodriguez, Comment, The United States’ Choice to Violate Interna-
tional Law by Allowing the Juvenile Death Penalty, 24 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 209, 
214 (2001).   
 258. de la Vega & Brown, supra note 50, at 757.   
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Article 4 paragraph 5.259  With most nations having signed or 
ratified one or more of those four treaties prohibiting the juve-
nile death penalty, it appears that the second element, demand-
ing that nations believe their prohibitions are required by cus-
tomary international law, is satisfied.260  While it is difficult to 
distinguish between “those habitual practices that are regarded 
as binding legal obligations [and] those [practices] that result 
simply from courtesy or diplomatic protocol, or from domestic 
policy considerations, and from which departure can ensue 
without breach of international law,”261 sentiments expressed by 
states when they are preparing treaties are excellent indicators 
of the parties’ view of the law.262  Therefore, because multilateral 
treaties in general, and more importantly human rights trea-
ties, clearly enunciate the intentions of the drafters — the coun-
tries of the world — their provisions can be interpreted to con-
sist of globally approved international law.263   
Moreover, in addition to proof of customary international law 
through treaties, the Inter-American Commission on Human 
Rights and the United Nations Human Rights Committee have 
both stated that there is a customary international norm pro-
hibiting the juvenile death penalty, though both groups were 
hesitant in setting the minimum age at eighteen.264  Even 
though the United States filed a reservation to the relevant 
provision in the ICCPR, the United Nations Human Rights 
  
 259. ICCPR, supra note 4, art. 6, para. 5; Geneva Convention, supra note 4, 
art. 68; CRC, supra note 4, art. 37; American Convention, supra note 4, art. 4, 
para. 5.   
 260. Wheaton-Rodriquez, supra note 257, at 215.   
 261. Nanda, supra note 207, at 1333.  See also de la Vega & Brown, supra 
note 50, at 757.   
 262. de la Vega & Brown, supra note 50, at 757.  For instance, when the 
ICCPR was being prepared the parties to it expressed their opinions concern-
ing the juvenile death penalty when they asked the question “what is the 
source of the nations’ disinclination to execute juvenile offenders other than a 
shared sense of the moral reprehensiveness of the practice?” Nanda, supra 
note 207, at 1334.  See also Joan F. Hartman, Unusual Punishment: The Do-
mestic Effects of International Norms Restricting the Application of the Death 
Penalty, 52 U. CIN. L. REV. 655, 671 (1983).   
 263. de la Vega & Brown, supra note 50, at 757.   
 264. See Wheaton-Rodriquez, supra note 257, at 215; William A. Schabas, 
International Law and Abolition of the Death Penalty, 55 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 
797, 813 (1998).     
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Committee concluded that said reservation was invalid.265  Sub-
sequently, on May 3, 2001, the United Nations Human Rights 
Committee voted to unseat the United States from itself.266  This 
is even further evidence of a worldwide customary international 
law norm, banning the juvenile death penalty, which is ob-
served by almost every other country except for the United 
States.   
Furthermore, the United States is not a persistent objector so 
it cannot evade its responsibilities under customary interna-
tional law to abstain from executing juvenile offenders.  While 
persistent objectors cannot prevent the development of custom-
ary international law norms by the rest of the world, those 
norms do not bind the State that has persistently objected to 
them.267  This doctrine allows a “state to avoid being involuntar-
ily subjected to a rule it finds unacceptable” but it does not 
permit “a state to reap the benefits of being a party to a treaty 
without having to conform to its terms and undergo domestic 
change.”268  However, a country cannot use the persistent objec-
tor doctrine to make reservations, declarations, understandings, 
or provisos to treaties with which it suddenly disagrees.269   
The United States is not a persistent objector to the practice 
of executing juveniles for the following reasons: (1) the United 
States did not object to the prohibition when drafting, signing, 
and ratifying the Fourth Geneva Convention, (2), the United 
States did not object to the prohibition in the ICCPR during its 
drafting and signing, (3) the United States did not object to the 
prohibition at the drafting and signing of the American Conven-
tion and, (4) the United States signed the CRC which contained 
the prohibition.270  Significantly, during the drafting of the 
  
 265. See supra pp. 1271–75 on the invalidation of the United States reserva-
tion to the ICCPR.   
 266. See Thalif Deen, Politics: U.S. Ouster from Rights Body Reflects Hostil-
ity, Int’l Press Serv., May 4, 2001, available at 2001 WL 20829289.  This could 
have been due, in part, to the United States disregard for international trea-
ties and the United Nations as evidenced by its conduct during the ratification 
process of the ICCPR.  See generally Wheaton-Rodriquez, supra note 257.   
 267. de la Vega & Brown, supra note 50, at 758.   
 268. Sherman, supra note 68, at 91.   
 269. de la Vega & Brown, supra note 50, at 758. 
 270. Id.  See also Wheaton-Rodriquez, supra note 257, at 217. The United 
States could say that it has been a persistent objector to the norm prohibiting 
the execution of juvenile offenders due to its ratification of the ICCPR with a 
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American Convention the United States not only failed to object 
to the prohibition but argued that setting a specific age limit 
went against the “already existent trend toward the abolition of 
the death penalty altogether.”271  Even more important is the 
fact that the United States only resurrected the juvenile death 
penalty after signing the ICCPR and before filing a reservation 
to Article 6 paragraph 5.272  While a treaty does not become the 
law of the land until it is ratified, by signing the ICCPR the 
United States was agreeing to try and follow its provisions and 
not pass contradictory laws; thus the United States’ reservation 
is invalid and of no value to the argument that the United 
States is a persistent objector to the norm.273   
Therefore, “it is fair to argue that under evolving interna-
tional standards, there is an emerging customary international 
law under which capital punishment of juveniles is prohib-
ited.”274  Due to the fact that the United States is not a persis-
tent objector, because it has not consistently disavowed the 
prohibition, it should be held to the customary international 
law standard concerning the execution of juvenile offenders and 
is thus in violation of that law.   
B. The Prohibition Against the Juvenile Death Penalty Has 
Reached the Level of a Jus Cogens Norm 
Even if considered to be a persistent objector to an emerging 
rule of customary international law prohibiting the execution of 
minors, the United States is still bound by established norms of 
  
juvenile death penalty reservation, its refusal to ratify the American Cove-
nant without a juvenile death penalty reservation, and its refusal to ratify the 
CRC.  de la Vega & Brown, supra note 50, at 758.  However, the better argu-
ment is that the United States has not been a persistent objector at all.  Id.  It 
is particularly important to note that at the time of the negotiation, drafting, 
and opening for signature of the ICCPR, the Protocols to the Geneva Conven-
tion, and the American Convention the United States had discontinued its use 
of the death penalty on juvenile offenders.  Id.  See also Nanda, supra note 
207, at 1332.  Therefore, “if indeed the prohibition against the juvenile death 
penalty is customary international law, under any reading of U.S. practice in 
this area [the United States is not a persistent objector.]”  de la Vega & 
Brown, supra note 50, at 758.     
 271. Nanda, supra note 207, at 1329. 
 272. de la Vega & Brown, supra note 50, at 758.   
 273. Id. at 759.  See also supra n.138.   
 274. Nanda, supra note 207, at 1328.   
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jus cogens.275  Article 53 of the Vienna Convention defines jus 
cogens as “a norm accepted and recognized by the international 
community of States as a whole as a norm from which no dero-
gation is permitted and which can be modified only by a subse-
quent norm of general international law having the same char-
acter.”276  Jus cogens norms are distinguished from ordinary in-
ternational law because jus cogens are “based on natural law 
propositions applicable to all legal systems, all persons, or the 
system of international law.”277  Thus these norms cannot be 
avoided by a persistent objector state and they prevail over any 
conflicting international rule of law.278  The Restatement 
adopted the Vienna Convention definition and added that 
“these rules prevail over and invalidate international agree-
ments and other rules of international law in conflict with 
them.”279  Thus, it follows that jus cogens norms are so impor-
tant, both internationally and nationally, that they could also 
invalidate conflicting domestic laws.280  Moreover, Article 53 of 
the Vienna Convention sets out four criteria for identifying per-
emptory norms (jus cogens norms): the norm is (1) one of gen-
eral international law; (2) accepted by the international com-
munity as a whole; (3) immune from derogation; and (4) modifi-
able only by a new norm having the same status.281 
The prohibition of the juvenile death penalty satisfies the 
four criteria and therefore reaches the level of a jus cogens 
norm.  First, the prohibition against the imposition of capital 
punishment on a juvenile offender has become a norm of gen-
eral international law; as discussed above, treaty law,282 deci-
sions of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights and 
  
 275. de la Vega & Brown, supra note 50, at 759.  See also Sherman, supra 
note 68, at 74.   
 276. Vienna Convention, supra note 33, at art. 53.   
 277. de la Vega & Brown, supra note 50, at 759 (quoting Johnathan A. 
Charney, Universal International Law, 87 AM. J. INT’L L. 529, 541 (1993)).   
 278. Id. at 759–60.   
 279. RESTATEMENT, supra note 36, § 102 cmt. k.   
 280. de la Vega & Brown, supra note 50, at 760. 
 281. Vienna Convention, supra note 33, at art. 53.  See also de la Vega & 
Fiore, supra note 138, at 225.     
 282. See supra pp. 1291–94 and corresponding footnotes concerning treaty 
law supporting the concept that the prohibition against the juvenile death 
penalty has become a customary international law norm.   
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the United Nations Human Rights Committee,283 and resolu-
tions passed by the United Nations Commission on Human 
Rights and the United Nations General Assembly284 exemplify 
the sentiments of the majority of the world that the juvenile 
death penalty is a norm from which there can be no derogation.  
Second, the fact that only eight countries have executed juve-
nile offenders within the last fourteen years is extremely strong 
evidence that a very large majority of nations have accepted the 
prohibition as a norm.285  The Restatement further explained 
this criterion by requiring that the norm “be accepted and rec-
ognized by a very large majority of states even if over dissent by 
a very small number of states.”286  As previously discussed, the 
United States is alone, as it is the only nation worldwide to not 
just allow for the execution of juvenile offenders but to also 
show no remorse in light of worldwide consensus against the 
practice.287  Furthermore, while United States courts have found 
that the prohibition against torture has attained the status of a 
jus cogens norm,288 over one-hundred-twenty-five countries have 
  
 283. See supra n.264 and corresponding text.   
 284. The United Nations Commission on Human Rights passed resolutions 
calling on states to abolish the death penalty generally and has specifically 
asked countries not to impose it on juvenile offenders.  de la Vega, supra note 
65, at 1044.  See, e.g., The Question of the Death Penalty, U.N. Commission on 
Human Rights, 58th Sess., Res. 2002/77, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/RES/2002/22 
(2002).  Similarly in 1985 the United Nations General Assembly, by consen-
sus, adopted the United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Admini-
stration of Juvenile Justice, know as the “Beijing Rules,” which also prohib-
ited the execution of juvenile offenders.  de la Vega, supra note 65, at 1044.  
See also G.A. Res. 40/33, U.N. GAOR, 40th Sess., Annex, Supp. No. 53, at 207, 
U.N. Doc. A/40/53 (1985).   
 285. See supra pp. 1288–91 and corresponding footnotes dealing with inter-
national death penalty statistics proving the worldwide acceptance of the 
prohibition of the juvenile death penalty. 
 286. RESTATEMENT, supra note 36, § 102 reporter’s note 6. 
 287. See text and footnotes discussing international death penalty statistics 
supra pp. 1288–91.  See also de la Vega, supra note 65, at 1047.   
 288. See, e.g., Siderman de Blake v. Republic of Arg., 965 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 
1992) (holding that torture was a violation of jus cogens but that because the 
violation was committed by a government outside of the United States, there 
was no jurisdiction over Argentina under an exception in the Foreign Sover-
eign Immunities Act).  The Court also observed that “because jus cogens 
norms do not depend solely on the consent of states for their binding force, 
they ‘enjoy the highest status within international law.”  For example, a 
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violated that norm in 2001.289  By contrast, only three countries 
have violated the norm prohibiting the juvenile death penalty 
in the past year.290  Third, the prohibition against the execution 
of juvenile offenders is a non-derogable norm.291  The ICCPR in 
Article 4 stated that there was to be “[n]o derogation from arti-
cles 6, 7, 8, 11, 15, 16, and 18 … under [that] provision.”292  Thus 
the international intent for the prohibition against the death 
penalty for juvenile offenders is per se non-derogable.293  Finally, 
there is no emerging norm, of the same status as that of the 
prohibition of the execution of juvenile offenders, which contra-
dicts or modifies this current norm.294 
Additional factors relevant to the determination of whether 
there is a jus cogens norm prohibiting the execution of juvenile 
offenders include the strength and conviction of the supporting 
states and the significance of the opposing states.295  The juve-
nile death penalty appears to be a perfect example of a jus co-
gens norm because such an overwhelming majority of the coun-
tries support the prohibition.296  While the United States is con-
sidered a significant force in the international community, the 
  
treaty that contravenes jus cogens is considered … to be void ….”  Id. at 715.  
See also de la Vega & Fiore, supra note 138, at 227–28.   
 289. See Amnesty International Report 2001, supra note 250.  See also de la 
Vega, supra note 65, at 1049.   
 290. See Amnesty International, Facts and Figures on the Death Penalty 
(2004) (AI Index: ACT 50/008/2004), available at http://www.web.amnesty.org/ 
library/index/engact500082004?open (last visited Apr. 16, 2004).  Amnesty 
International recorded two executions of child offenders in 2003, one of them 
in China and one in the United States.  Id.  Another child offender was exe-
cuted in Iran in January of 2004.  Id.  See supra pp. 1288–91 and correspond-
ing footnotes.  See also de la Vega, supra note 65, at 1049.   
 291. de la Vega & Brown, supra note 50, at 761.   
 292. ICCPR, supra note 4, art. 4.  See also de la Vega & Brown, supra note 
50, at 761. 
 293. See de la Vega & Brown, supra note 50, at 761.  This express provision 
in the ICCPR, coupled with the wide acceptance of the prohibition against the 
execution of juveniles, as evidenced by treaties, resolutions such as those of 
the United Nations Commission on Human Rights calling for the abolition of 
the death penalty (and the execution of juvenile offenders especially) and na-
tional laws and practice, all lead to the conclusion that the anti-juvenile death 
penalty norm is non-derogable.  de la Vega, supra note 65, at 1050.   
 294. de la Vega, supra note 65, at 1049.   
 295. Charney, supra note 277, at 542.  See also de la Vega & Brown, supra 
note 50, at 761.   
 296. See Wheaton-Rodriquez, supra note 257, at 212.   
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fact that only three other countries have executed juvenile of-
fenders in the past year gives tremendous weight to the argu-
ment that the opposition is insufficient to thwart the establish-
ment of a jus cogens norm.297  Thus, the abolition of the juvenile 
death penalty rises to the level of jus cogens status from which 
no state can derogate.   
Therefore, the treaty law dealing with the prohibition of the 
execution of juvenile offenders has, at the very least, risen to 
the level of customary international law and may very well even 
be a jus cogens norm.  As the United States has recently passed 
the 100th anniversary of the Paquete Habana decision it is im-
portant to remember that now, more than ever, “international 
law is part of our law and must be ascertained [and respected] 
by the courts of justice of appropriate jurisdiction.”298  As such, 
the United States is in violation of the international law abol-
ishing the juvenile death penalty and should change its prac-
tices to conform to the international norms and standards and 
the courts should use these laws to determine juvenile death 
penalty cases like Toronto M. Patterson’s.299   
IV. POSSIBLE REPERCUSSIONS THAT THE UNITED STATES 
JUDICIAL SYSTEM MAY FACE IF IT DOES NOT CHANGE ITS 
DEATH PENALTY PRACTICES. 
While the United States judicial system is obligated under 
Article VI Section 2 of the United States Constitution to treat 
all ratified international agreements as the “supreme law of the 
land”300 as well as to take into consideration the international 
consensus on a subject in the form of established customary in-
ternational law and/or jus cogens norms, there are other impor-
  
 297. de la Vega & Brown, supra note 50, at 761.   
 298. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900) (one of the most influen-
tial cases on the application of international law in our domestic courts) (em-
phasis added).  Moreover, the Restatement provides that “[i]nternational law 
and international agreements of the United States are the law of the United 
States and supreme over the law of the several States” and “[c]ourts in the 
United States are bound to give effect to international law and to interna-
tional agreements of the United States.”  RESTATEMENT, supra note 36, § 102.  
This principle that customary international law is a part of United States law 
applies with even greater force when considering a peremptory norm, such as 
the juvenile death penalty.  See de la Vega, supra note 65, at 1051.   
 299. Patterson v. State of Texas, 536 U.S. 984 (2002). 
 300. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.   
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tant reasons that the United States should amend its death 
penalty practices.  Of the multiple domestic problems which can 
arise out of the practice of the United States allowing for capital 
punishment, and more specifically the execution of juvenile of-
fenders, the most troublesome is the potential inability to ob-
tain evidence or witnesses for death penalty cases from coun-
tries that prohibit the practice.  This issue has played an inte-
gral role in the recent developments of the cases against 
Zacarias Moussaoui (the alleged twentieth September 11th hi-
jacker) and Lee Boyd Malvo (the convicted D.C. area sniper).   
With regard to the case against French national Zacarias 
Moussaoui, there were recent difficulties in obtaining evidence.  
French and German authorities were in possession of important 
documents that could establish a link between Mr. Moussaoui 
and the al Qaeda terrorist network.301  These crucial pieces of 
evidence included records of money transfers from a member of 
the Hamburg-based terrorist cell that carried out the Septem-
ber 11, 2001 attacks on the World Trade Center and the Penta-
gon and were vital to the prosecution’s case.302  However, the 
German Constitution forbids “submission of any material that 
could lead to the death penalty.”303  Since the prosecution 
planned to seek capital punishment for Mr. Moussaoui, the 
German government was unwilling to release the documents 
that they had compiled on Mr. Moussaoui.304  Thus, from a prac-
tical standpoint, the prosecution stood the chance of having the 
case dismissed or transferred to a Military Court if they could 
not produce enough evidence for the criminal trial.305   
Intelligence-sharing in criminal cases involving the death 
penalty “has long been an issue between the United States and 
its Western European Allies.”306  Fortunately, however, the 
three countries involved — the United States, France, and 
  
 301. Dan Egan, U.S. to Get Moussaoui Data From Europe; French, Germans 
Strike Deal Barring Use of Documents to Seek Death Penalty, WASH. POST, 
Nov. 28, 2002, at A19.   
 302. Id.  See also Philip Shenon, Threats and Responses: Terror Suspect; 
Germany Urges U.S. to Drop Death Penalty Plan, WASH. POST, Oct. 26, 2002, 
at A9.   
 303. Id.   
 304. Id.   
 305. See id.   
 306. Shenon, supra note 302, at A9.   
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Germany — were able to reach an agreement with regard to the 
material.  Germany consented to granting the United States the 
evidence needed, under the condition that the United States 
would not use that material to seek the death penalty.307  The 
United States conceded, and, in reality, did not really give up 
much except for the use of the material obtained by Germany in 
the sentencing trial after Mr. Moussaui is convicted,308 but the 
possible ramifications of this concession by the federal govern-
ment could have disastrous effects in the future.  As a result, 
there is a question as to how the government will handle other 
conditions on the acquisition of evidence abroad in cases where 
the death penalty is sought.  This uncertainty could pose an 
enormous burden on prosecutors and could result in cases being 
dismissed due to the inability of the prosecutor to obtain enough 
evidence to make a prima facia case, even if that information is 
available but located in a country with abolitionist laws.  More-
over, a defendant’s procedural due process right309 could be in-
fringed upon if the defense cannot obtain exculpatory evidence 
from foreign countries that are unable or unwilling to supply 
information that will be used in a trial involving capital pun-
ishment.  Thus, the death penalty, regardless of the age of the 
defendant to be tried, has and will continue to bar the effective 
and efficient implementation of our judicial system. 
In considering Lee Boyd Malvo’s case, a situation arose that 
was intricately intertwined with the arguments made in this 
Comment.  Lee Malvo, the seventeen year old suspected “D.C. 
sniper,” was indicted by a Virginia grand jury for capital mur-
der in connection with the death of Linda Franklin, an FBI ana-
lyst who was shot and killed as she left a Home Depot™ store in 
  
 307. Egan, supra note 301, at A19.   
 308. Id.  This of course has all become moot, at least for the moment, be-
cause presiding judge Leonie M. Brinkema has held that the government can-
not seek the death penalty against Mr. Moussaoui because he was denied 
access to witnesses held overseas who helped plan the September 11th attack 
and under the Sixth Amendment criminal defendants are afforded the right to 
confront accusers and seek out testimony that might prove their innocence.  
Shenon, supra note 302, at A9.  However, the Justice Department has ap-
pealed the judge’s ruling, so this issue may reappear again in the future.  
Philip Shenon, U.S. to Appeal Ruling on 9/11 Terror Suspect, WASH. POST, 
Oct. 8, 2003, at A28.   
 309. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV.   
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Virginia.310  The Court decided to try Lee Malvo as an adult and 
because Virginia does not specify a minimum age in its capital 
punishment statute, the seventeen year old would have to face 
the death penalty if he was convicted.311  On December 18, 2003, 
after deliberating for fourteen hours, the jury found Lee Malvo 
“guilty of capital murder as an act of terrorism for killing 
[Linda] Franklin and demanding $10 million from the govern-
ment, and guilty of capital murder for killing more than one 
person in three years.”312  Although the jury ultimately spared 
Lee Malvo’s life,313 Lee Malvo almost joined the ranks of Toronto 
M. Patterson as the newest juvenile offender sentenced to 
death.   
From the perspective of international law, one of the most in-
teresting aspects of this case was the fact that Lee Malvo was 
an illegal immigrant from Jamaica, who had come to the United 
States with his mother Una James in late 1999 or early 2000.314  
His mother was deported on November 20, 2002 after deciding 
not to appeal a deportation order issued by an immigration 
judge on November 19, 2002.315  This became a significant issue 
during Lee Malvo’s capital murder trial and later during the 
sentencing phase.  Evidence and witnesses located abroad in 
the Caribbean were necessary for the defense’s case.316   The de-
fense needed the testimony of several Jamaican nationals, 
friends and family of Lee Malvo, as exculpatory evidence in ad-
dition to evidence of mitigating factors that might persuade the 
jury to spare Lee Malvo’s life.317  Such witnesses and evidence 
  
 310. See Stephan Kiehl, Va. Judge Bans Broadcast of Muhammad Trial; He 
Will Allow Still Cameras If They Aren’t a Distraction, BALT. SUN., Dec. 13, 
2002, at A14.   
 311. See Va. Code. Ann. § 18.2-31.   
 312. Tom Jackman, Malvo Guilty of Capital Murder; Sniper Trial Jury to 
Choose Life or Death Sentence, WASH. POST, Dec. 19, 2003, at A01.   
 313. Tom Jackman, Malvo is Spared Death Penalty; Jury Gives Teen Life 
Sentence for His Role in Sniper Slayings, WASH. POST, Dec. 24, 2003, at A01.   
 314. See Mary Beth Sheridan & Maria Glod, Malvo’s Mother Being Deported 
to Jamaica; Documents Describe Una James’s Efforts to Leave Homeland, Get 
U.S. Residency, WASH. POST, Dec. 14, 2002, at B01.   
 315. Mother of Teen Suspect in Sniper Case Deported, HOUS. CHRON., Dec. 
14, 2002, at A15. 
 316. Tom Jackman, Malvo’s Prosecutors Resist Video Testimony; Defense 
Has Witnesses in Caribbean, WASH. POST, Oct. 15, 2003, at B05.   
 317. Jackman, supra note 312, at A01.   
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had to be brought to the United States, and Jamaica, a country 
which does not allow for the execution of juvenile offenders, 
could have refused to send the evidence or extradite the wit-
nesses (similar to the situation in the Moussaui case).  This re-
fusal could have, in effect, crippled the defense’s efforts in effec-
tively making a case.  As it was, defense attorneys filed several 
motions to either allow key witnesses into the country who were 
barred from re-entry — like Lee Malvo’s mother — or to permit 
the use of video conferencing for those witnesses.318  Ultimately, 
the necessary witnesses were allowed to testify in court319 but if 
they had not, either due to United States laws or Jamaican 
laws, and no video conferencing was offered, then there would 
have been a constitutional violation and possible mistrial.320   
It is not unusual for the United States to seek extradition of 
criminal defendants or witnesses from other countries.  How-
ever, the practice of extraditing individuals on the condition 
that they are not subject to capital punishment also has a long 
history, originating in the mid-nineteenth century when states 
began abolishing capital punishment in their domestic legal 
systems.321  Several model multilateral extradition treaties, such 
as Article IV of the 1990 Model Treaty on Extradition proposed 
by the Eighth United Nation’s Congress on the Prevention of 
Crime and Treatment of Offenders,322 include references to re-
strictions on extradition in cases where the death penalty could 
  
 318. Jackman, supra note 316, at B05.   
 319. Henri E. Cauvin, At the Core of the Case: Should a Life Be Spared?, 
WASH. POST, Dec. 19, 2003, at A01.   
 320. Jackson, supra note 316, at B05.  Moreover, Lee Boyd Malvo is not yet 
out of the danger of the juvenile penalty.  He may have to face the death pen-
alty again as he has been charged with capital murder in Prince William and 
Spotsylvania counties in Virginia, as well as in Louisiana and Alabama.  
Jackman, supra note 313, at A01.   
 321. William A. Schabas, Indirect Abolition: Capital Punishment’s Role in 
Extradition Law and Practice, 25 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 581, 584 
(2003).   
 322. Model Treaty on Extradition, U.N. GAOR 3d Comm., 45th Sess., 
Agenda Item 100, at 6, U.N. Doc. A/RES/45/116 (1991) (stating that “Extradi-
tion may be refused in any of the following circumstances … [i]f the offence 
[sic] for which extradition is requested carries the death penalty under the 
law of the requesting State, unless that State gives such assurances as the 
requested States considers sufficient that the death penalty will not be im-
pose, or if imposed, will not be carried out.”  Article 11 of the European Con-
vention on Extradition also includes such language.   
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be imposed.  The seminal case on this issue was Soering v. 
United Kingdom, where the defendant fled to Great Britain af-
ter murdering his girlfriend and her parents in Virginia.323  
There, the defendant, Jans Soering, petitioned the European 
Commission of Human Rights to stop his extradition to the 
United States on the ground that he would be subjected to the 
death penalty if he were tried there.324  However, if he were to 
remain in the United Kingdom, he would not face that punish-
ment.325  The European Court of Human Rights ultimately held 
that the extradition of the defendant was barred because it vio-
lated the prohibition against “inhuman or degrading treatment 
or punishment” in the European Convention.326  After Soering, 
member countries of the Council of Europe would no longer ex-
tradite witnesses, evidence, or suspects to states where it was 
probable that the death penalty would be imposed.   
Furthermore, a State sending witnesses, evidence, or sus-
pects to a requesting State could be in violation of the relevant 
extradition treaty law as well as customary international law if 
they extradite to a State practicing capital punishment without 
first acquiring guarantees from that receiving State that the 
death penalty will not be imposed.  For example, Article VI of 
the 1976 Extradition Treaty between Canada and the United 
States entitles the sending country to insist upon sufficient 
guarantees that the death penalty will not be imposed as a con-
dition for extradition.327  However, Canada had been extraditing 
individuals to the United States without assurances against the 
use of capital punishment for many years.328  This caused a split 
between Canada and the other members of the United Nations 
Commission on Human Rights and then in 2001, in United 
States v. Burns, the Supreme Court of Canada reversed its posi-
tion by refusing to allow extradition of a man who faced murder 
charges and a death penalty trial in the United States.329  The 
  
 323. Soering v. United Kingdom, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1989).   
 324. Id.   
 325. Id.   
 326. Id.   
 327. Extradition Treaty Between Canada and the United States of America, 
Dec. 3, 1971, U.S.-Can., 27 U.S.T. 983, 1976 Can. T.S. No. 3.  See also, Scha-
bas, supra note 321, at 585.   
 328. See Schabas, supra note 321, at 598.   
 329. United States v. Burns, 2001 S.C.C. 7 (Feb. 15, 2001). 
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Court held that extradition would impose cruel and unusual 
punishment on the defendant and thus would violate its 
abolitionist laws.330   
Similarly in the case of Pietro Venezia,331 Italy would not 
honor the terms of its extradition treaty with the United States 
to send the suspect to the United States for trial, even though it 
had been given assurances that capital punishment would not 
be sought.332  The Italian Constitutional Court declared that cer-
tain provisions of its Code of Penal Procedure, designed to give 
effect to the extradition treaty between Italy and the United 
States, were contrary to Article 2 of the Italian Constitution 
which guarantees to Italian citizens the right to life as an invio-
lable human right.333   
Therefore, in cases like Lee Boyd Malvo’s, if witnesses or evi-
dence were required then Jamaica, or a country in a similar 
position, could also argue that it would not send the information 
because it might ultimately result in the imposition of the death 
penalty on a juvenile offender, a consequence that offended its 
domestic laws and customary international law.  Thus the 
death penalty policies of the United States, in regard to both 
adults and minors, may in effect hamper the very judicial sys-
tem on which our nation is based.  At the very least, the United 
States should comply with international law standards and 
abolish the juvenile death penalty. 
CONCLUSION 
In continuing to execute juvenile offenders the United States 
has violated its duties under international law.  First, since the 
United States ratified the Fourth Geneva Convention and the 
ICCPR, both of which call for the abolition of the juvenile death 
penalty, it has breached its obligations under those treaties by 
continuing the practice.  The fact that the United States filed a 
reservation to the ICCPR is irrelevant because that reservation 
goes against the very purpose of the treaty and as such is inva-
lid.  Moreover, regardless of whether a defendant can bring a 
  
 330. Id.   
 331. Venezia v. Ministero di Grazia e Giustizia, Corte Cost., 27 June 1996, 
79 Rivista di Dritto Internazionale 815 (1996).   
 332. Id.   
 333. See Schabas, supra note 321, at 597.   
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private action under the ICCPR in a United States court, de-
fendants must still be allowed to use that treaty, in addition to 
the Fourth Geneva Convention, the American Convention, and 
the CRC, as a defense to prosecution against them.  Further-
more, the prohibition of the juvenile death penalty has reached 
the level of customary international law and may even be a non-
derogable jus cogens norm.  Thus, the United States has vio-
lated that international norm and must conform to the newly 
emerged international consensus.  Finally, even if the United 
States refuses to recognize and comply with the international 
standards that prohibit the juvenile death penalty, it should 
abolish the practice as a practical matter because of its possible 
deleterious effects on the American judicial system. 
Jennifer L. Brillante∗ 
 
  
 ∗ Jennifer L. Brillante is a graduate of the University of Pennsylvania 
and is currently a student at Brooklyn Law School receiving her J.D. in June 
2004.  The author would like to thank everyone who assisted her in the prepa-
ration of this note.  Among those who contributed to this piece she would like 
to extend special thanks to Professors Ursula Bentele and Claire Kelly for 
their tireless efforts and encouragement.  This note is dedicated to the au-
thor’s family, especially her grandmother Geraldine Fecci, for their love, guid-
ance, support, and inspiration throughout her education.   
